# National Human Development Report 2018

Achieving Human Development in North East Nigeria

UNDP

Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

National Human Development Report 2018

Achieving Human Development in North East Nigeria

Towards an Understanding of the Humanitarian-Development – Peace Nexus

This special regional edition of the National Human Development Report has been prepared to provide a more in-depth understanding of both the causal root factors as well as the tragic consequences to Human life, following the decade-long 'Boko Haram' instigated conflict and violence. The Report also aims at proposing an alternate, if not novel and integrated framework model for unpacking and understanding the consequential 'Humanitarian-Developmental-Peace Nexus'.

The cover illustration used on this 2018 Report attempts a depiction of the diversity of the Nigerian Federation. The different groups of people from all corners of the Federation bring their uniqueness that contribute to the whole. Instructively, these groups, as part of the whole have a role to play jointly and individually towards efforts required in addressing the challenge posed by insurgency, violence, conflict and the resultant devastation of the economic and political infrastructure of Nigeria's North-East region.

Table of Contents

Chapter 4

Journeying Towards a 'New Way of Working': A Framework Model for Achieving
Rehabilitation, Re-Integration and Sustainable Development

List of Tables

List of figures

Foreword

I am honoured to write a foreword to this *Human Development Report* themed around *Achieving Human Development for Nigeria's North East*. I am happy to note that just like in 2016, when the national HDR focused on *'Human Security and Human Development in Nigeria'* and underlined the imperative of Human Security across the board, the focus of this Report on Nigeria's North East is equally timely. It has been distressing that the North East is now almost synonymous with the uncanny phenomenon of insurgency that has been mounted under the banner of *Boko Haram.* The term *Boko Haram* has, indeed, become the imprimatur and currency of unbridled conflict, terror and violence that has taken its toll on North East Nigeria for slightly more than a decade. It is therefore gratifying that for the second time, the UNDP is standing with Nigeria in this noble attempt to understand and propose lasting remedial measures to a crisis that has probably blighted Nigeria's standing among the comity of nations more than any other in contemporary times.

In terms of its substance, I am happy to note that the 2018 report is neither frivolous nor simplistic in its assessment. It has, in fact, duly appreciated that the problem associated with the North East is a rather complex and multi-faceted one. The Report has carefully chronicled both the possible internal as well as the external enablers that fuel the violence and conflict leading to the monumental humanitarian challenge the region is now grappling with. The one terrible impact and evidence of it all, has been the deaths of tens of thousands and displacement of close to two million Nigerians spread right across the six states of the North East. These deaths and displacements occurred in the relatively short period of just between 2009 and 2016.

But the region in its entirety has also faced other forms of human destruction that are more disturbing and disconcerting. These include, in the words of the Report, the *"… abduction and trafficking of persons - mostly boy children used as foot soldiers, and girl children used as sex slaves; displacement of persons from their homes and livelihoods, and radicalization of populations through religiously articulated ideological indoctrination and extremist political propaganda…"* These, to say nothing of the severe destruction of the economic and social as well as the agricultural basis of livelihoods in the region. Life in many parts of the North East has been severely imperilled, including the stigma associated with homelessness, but more fundamentally, the long-term psycho-social impacts of terror and destruction. Education and Health facilities, not to mention the environment have all been destroyed. Moreover, the loss or migration by a large segment of critical human capacities will take many generations to rebuild. For the long term, this type of scenario presents a major developmental challenge for the people of Nigeria in their collective. Without a shadow of doubt, the task of reconstruction will certainly therefore be one of the most important and urgent agendas in the policy and programmatic vision of the Federal Government of Nigeria under H.E. President Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR.

On the upside of things, I am penning this foreword at a time when there are some extremely positive vibes, and the report does make some robust and useful recommendations on just how to tackle this morass; especially on the basis of a fully holistic and well-integrated model that leaves no one behind. Moreover, the *Lake Chad Basin Governors Forum* has just been inaugurated as part of the international call to rally together in tackling a debilitating crisis. It is my earnest hope, and indeed that of the entire Federal Government, that the Forum will play its part in healing the deep wounds while also helping in finding lasting solutions to the humanitarian and developmental challenge facing the region currently. With this, as well as many other initiatives currently underway and the assured support of the international community, I remain optimistic that the North East and Nigeria as a whole will walk tall again.

Zainab S. Ahmed
Honourable Minister of Finance

Preface

For close to three decades, UNDPs *Human Development Reports* (HDRs) have curved their niche as one of the most highly prized signature knowledge products of the United Nations System. Since the first appearance back in 1990, the vision to provide a scientific measurement of the totality of Human Development that goes beyond the primordial focus on income and wellbeing indicators has been alive. This edition of Nigeria's HDR has remained faithful to that original vision.

The report has picked for its focus, the human plight presently associated with the North East of the nation for close to one decade now. And beyond merely giving a chronicle of the extent of human devastation and waste, the report's main intent is to signal to the highly complex and multi-faceted and multi-dimensional syndrome sometimes referred in emerging UN parlance as the *Humanitarian-Development and Peace Nexus* of which the North East definitively presents a classic case study. As it were, the first and second chapters of the report are thus devoted to presenting the critical historical background issues; including reference to the main causal factors that unleashed the *Boko Haram* insurgency. As is now fairly well known, that spate of insurgency, characterised by what are in their essence, senseless killings and violence, displacements and destruction of property is now widely accepted to bear the full hallmarks of terrorism. Chapter two of the report goes into more in-depth assessment of the historical and causal factors but also incorporates the widely used Human Development Indicators: poverty and deprivation; low human development, unemployment and other indices that have been summarised to constitute basic structural inequalities, including the governance deficit. In presenting this scenario in terms of facts, figures and perceptions based on a UNDP commissioned study, the important factor associated with the use of religion for political indoctrination also emerges as critically important.

The real novelty of this report is probably in its chapter four where a framework model for 'unpacking the nexus" is presented. The model presents what has been aptly referred as the *Insurgency Quantum Factor,* itself the equivalent of the amount of radicalisation, recruitment and resultant terrorism that is subtracted from the purposive response in terms of resilience building, rehabilitation and other forms of sustainable socio-economic support. In the usual tradition, the report is also rich in terms of vital statistical annexes and technical notes aimed at providing the data as of the time of the report, all very useful in objectively and scientifically presenting the situation in the North East.

It must be stressed conclusively, that the views canvassed in this report are not in any way the views held by UNDP as an organization. Rather the letter and spirit of this report is to present yet another opportunity for the sober reflection and intellectual discoursing on Nigeria's North East and thereby, not only advancing knowledge and understanding of 'the Nexus,' but also, triggering fundamental policy shifts that can inform long-term remedial measures in all global situations faced with these types of unbridled flare-ups.

Edward Kallon
Resident Representative

Acknowledgements

The preparation and final production of this Report has seen to the efforts and collaboration between many individuals and various institutions.

First and foremost, the UNDP Nigeria Country Office set up a National Steering Committee (NSC) co-chaired by the Minister of State for Budget and National Planning, Hon (Madam) Zainab S. Ahmed, and Mr Edward Kallon, the UNDP Resident Representative. The NSC provided the overall policy direction and guidance while a Technical Committee co-chaired by the Statistician General of the Federation and the UNDP Economic Advisor for Nigeria and ECOWAS oversaw the computation of the various indices of Human Development: the HDI, the I-HDI, the GII and the MPI. The actual computation of these indices was undertaken by a core team at the National Bureau of Statistics comprising Dr Yemi Kale, the Statistician General of the Federation; Dr Isiaka Olarewaju, Mr S.B Harry, Mrs Patricia Eweama, Mr Adeyemi, Mr Ajebiyi Fafunmi, Mr Baba Madu and Sam Adakole. We would like to most sincerely thank the Technical Committee members for their dedication in computing the indices and preparing the extremely important Technical Notes and Statistical Annexes included in the report and without which any Human Development Report would be incomplete.

We specifically acknowledge the untiring dedication of the UNDP Country Office team led by Ojijo Odhiambo (UNDP Economic Advisor for Nigeria and ECOWAS), along with Robert Asogwa and Grace Arinze-Ononwu all working under the leadership of the Country Director, who conceptualised the thematic focus area for the report and oversaw its preparatory process right up to the end. Chapter four that specifically proposes a model and an analytical framework for "unpacking the Humanitarian-Development - Peace - Nexus, benefited immensely from the contributions by Ojijo Odhiambo. Substantial contribution from Lucky Musonda, Head of our Communication Unit not only ensured consistency with corporate publication guidelines but also improved the report's design and visual appeal.

We would also like to acknowledge the team of highly dedicated peer-reviewers: Angela Lusigi (UNDP–New York); Amarakoon Bandara (UNDP–Zimbabwe); James Wakiaga (UNDP–Ethiopia); Rogers Dhliwayo (UNDP–Kenya) and Joerg Kuhnel (UNDP–Nigeria) all who provided invaluable comments on the initial draft of this report.

The report has obviously drawn from various sources and publications prepared by other UN Agencies and non-UN Agencies, including a lot of international NGOs. We therefore record our appreciation for their continued focus and dedication that has helped in putting the unique challenges of Nigeria's North East under international focus and scrutiny.

Last but not least, we express profound appreciation to the Federal Government of Nigeria, and specifically, the support and good-working relationship between the UNDP and the Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning and the National Bureau of Statistics.

To one and all, I say a big thank you.

Samuel Bwalya
Country Director, UNDP

Acronyms and Abbreviations

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FCT	Federal Capital Tertiary
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HCD	Human Capital Development
HDR	Human Development Report
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEDs	improvised explosive devices
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
LGAs	Local Government Areas
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NDPVF	Niger Delta People Volunteer Force
NPE	National Policy on Education
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OPC	Oduwa People's Congress
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation
WIR	World Investment Report

Report Summary, Conclusions and Key Messages

1. The Report Objectives

The main objective in commissioning a study of Nigeria's North East and the subsequent preparation of a *Human Development Report* (HDR) has been to provide an independent and fairly objective analysis of the root causes of conflict and violence, and, consequently, the humanitarian and development crisis that has raged therein and peaking in the last decade. A key objective has also been to propose an analytical and conceptual framework for unpacking and operationalising the Humanitarian- Development- Peace Nexus, in the context of the North East Nigeria, specifically, and more generally, the entire Lake Chad Basin and elsewhere.

Specifically, the study and report was conceptualised and aimed at:

(i)   **Identifying** the root historical, socio-cultural as well as the socio-economic causes of conflict and violence in the North East;

(ii)   **Assesing** the specific contribution of the main social and economic factors and especially the place of perceived 'exclusion' and 'marginalisation' in exacerbating conflicts, violence and insurgency in the North East;

(iii)   **Identifying and analysing** the manifestations of violence and insurgency on the region, with special focus on the human, developmental as well as humanitarian consequences;

(iv)   **Enumerating and presenting** a range of new, innovative and bold policy options for addressing or resolving the conflict and violence in the region; and,

(v)   **Reflecting on and proposing a new analytical and conceptual framework** for understanding and addressing the raging crisis and similar types of crises with a view to advancing and expanding the forntiers of knowledge in conflict resolution, rehabilitation and re-integration. This, in specific terms, is also especially intended as the novelty in this particular HDR.

2. The NHDR's Specific Focus on the North East

This 2018 *Human Development Report* focuses on the North East region of Nigeria, comprising the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Nigeria's North East region has in recent years acquired some sort of worldwide fame and notoriety, for the conflict and widespread violence that has generally been associated with the militant insurgency of the Islamic fundamentalist group better known as *Boko Haram.* To date, the signature exploit of this extremist group whose tendencies mirror those of other world-renowned terrorist groupings that emerged in diverse locations of the world in recent years, is forever represented in the widely reported abduction and capture of the two hundred and seventy-six (276) 'Chibok Girls.' This report has therefore timeously sought to call attention to the often outrageous and terrifying humanitarian and developmental crisis that has evolved in the last decade as to make Nigeria's North East region one of the world's most lesson-bearing and critical flashpoints.

3. The Report Preparation Process

This report is primarily based on data and information gleaned from various authoritative national sources under the guidance and direction of a National Steering Committee. In computing the various indices or measures of Human Development, the report also relied on data sourced from secondary sources at the National Bureau of Statistics, MICS 5-2016 and a survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, in close collaboration with UNDP purposively for collecting data on the various indices in 2017, referred to as the HDI 2017 Survey. The survey covered households in both urban and rural areas in all the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. These data were used to compile the *Human Development Index*; *Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index*; *Gender Inequality Index* and the *Multidimensional Poverty Index.*

Additionally, the report benefitted from empirical reviews and studies undertaken by two independent consultants commissioned by the UNDP Nigeria Country Office and whose basic mix of methodology included an in-depth desk review of the relevant literature on socio-economic and socio-cultural causal factors, some of which date back the pre-colonial period. This was followed by another field work in the North East region to capture the peoples' perceptions. Using the information from these diverse sources, a draft report was prepared and subjected to peer review at various stages.

4. The Report in Summary

This Report commences with two background chapters that have outlined to some detail, the better known geographic, historical, socio-cultural, socio-economic, political as well as the religious and ideological factors that have helped fuel one of the most pronounced, multi-faceted and complex humanitarian and development crisis known to the international community today. In presenting the relevant background factors, the report has touched on and tried to assess the root, as well as the proximate causal factors that fuelled the crisis; including in particular, what has been adjudged as the deficits in state promise, or if one likes: the shortcomings of governance in some respects. The expanding influence of a puritanical Islamic ideology that saw to flare-ups in the wider Maghreb and arguably, spilling into the wider Lake Chad Basin where the bulk of Nigeria's North East is located has been touched upon. The virtual rejection, among certain groups in the region, of Western Education and from which, incidentally, the *Boko Haram* derives its name, along with the contested history of colonialism have been touched upon. In sum, the report has touched on the internal enabling factors, the enabling external support systems, as well as their various manifestations, that catapulted into a complex nexus of humanitarian and developmental crisis in all its possible manifestations.

4.1 The Historical and Socio-Cultural Factors

In terms of the historical background, the abiding influence of the earlier *jihad* associated with Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio is apical and remains a major factor accounting for the rise of *Boko Haram*. The so-

cio-cultural nexus identifies, *inter alia*, the polygamous orientation of the local population which it has been argued, accounts for the phenomenal increase in population, especially of the young people, the so called 'youth bulge' that could not be properly catered for. The resultant huge population of idle and unemployed youth encourage what is known locally as the *Almajeri* phenomenon – an entrenched cultural practice, it has meant that children are sent to distant places, away from their biological parents in order to acquire *Qur'anic* education. In general, this is a fodder that has partly fuelled the crisis, especially given that the *Almajeris* (street children or child beggars) live in extremely appalling conditions and hence spend their time begging for alms or else are readily available for recruitment into extremist organizations such as the *Boko Haram*.

4.2 Politics, Religious Ideology and the Governance Deficit

In terms of the political and governance systems, the report is unequivocal that the *Boko Haram* insurgency is in a significant sense, a response to the consequences of progressive failure of governance; particularly in so far as Nigeria's North East is concerned. A key failure cited is the persistence of governance deficits that appear to torpedo or frustrate the freedom of political choice. But the report has also made reference to the ideological underpinning of *Boko Haram* in particular; the spirited effort to render it as a potent counter-argument and rebellion against pervasive governance deficit and resultant low levels of development. When the perception of bad governance is coupled with widespread poverty, the youth have become highly skeptical about a democratic system that has brought them little benefit and only serve the interests of a small political elite. Hopelessness and frustrations as a result of unemployment and widespread poverty have therefore lured the largely youthful population to embrace resistance. The strong ideological orientation and notion in some quarters that Western Education is the cause of corruption, inequality and injustice bedevilling the society and hence must be forbidden makes *Boko Haram* particularly appealing. The religious factor has been strongly canvassed in this report as a major factor in the emergence of *Boko Haram* and violence in the region. What is critical is the fact that reli-

gion *per se* may not have been the problem, but the fact that it is easily manipulated for various selfish reasons. Accordingly, it must be noted that although the *Boko Haram* is readily linked to the Islamic faith and religion, track must not be lost of the fact that both Christians and Muslims have been easy targets of violence depending on how the manipulation is actually done or operationalised.

4.3 The Complex Nature of the Humanitarian, Peace and Development Nexus

This report has established-without equivocation, that the humanitarian crisis in the North East region is far from over. More importantly, it is a humanitarian crisis that is complex, multi-faceted and indeed monumental. Not only has more than two million people been displaced and tens of thousands killed in the last decade alone, but the sheer destruction of the basic economic and social infrastructure will take a long time to rebuild. The impact of the insurgency on all the basic Human Development indices is colossal. As detailed out in chapter three of the report, the experience of people, especially those in IDP camps and the measures of well-being, as captured in the various reports and community surveys; education, health, the environment, gender, water, hygiene and sanitation – among others, have all worsened. The complexity of dealing with the category that may be called, 'undocumented IDPs' since they live in rather unclear circumstances within the 'host communities' and quietly bearing the full brunt of economic deprivation, cultural discrimination as well as the noted lack of access to basic health services, including sanitation, is simply huge. Closely related and as critical is the fact that unless all-round efforts are put in place to comprehensively deal with and reverse the trend, there would be legitimate fear that the insurgency will and can only mutate to actually cause more devastation not only across Nigeria, but right into the entire Lake Chad Basin and other neighbouring areas in the region and globally. Conclusively, it can be said that although there have been commendable governmental engagement and interventions, it is clear that the prevailing situation requires a lot more in terms of the capacity of security forces to provide security for everyone, let alone the guarantee of shelter and accommodation.

4.4 An Integrated Conceptual and Resolution Model

In view of the foregoing summary, this Report has presented and proposed some kind of novel framework model that can be considered, not just for intervention and mitigation, but for the guarantee of reintegration, development, and ultimately, sustainability. The core essence of the model is its three plus five (3+5) Integrated Framework; i.e. three response pillars underpinned by five guiding principles defining the schematic configuration within a clearly stressed and vulnerable nexus. The proposal includes the basic pillars for **peace and security**; **humanitarian intervention** as well as the **developmental response**, most ideally working in tandem or moving together in an inter-connected, non-linear and non-sequential manner. But these basic pillars must, of necessity, be underpinned by the five principles of **good governance; effective partnerships; h**uman capacities; assured funding and financing**, as well as, investments in **deep and reliable data.** The peace and security pillar envisages specific components such as an increased use of local security systems in the form of community policing and local vigilante groups. It also includes concerted multi-dimensional response as well as attention to deliberate peace building initiatives; including in teaching and education generally. As is fairly customary, the humanitarian response pillar remains the first line of action, particularly in the provision of life-saving interventions in the form of food and non-food items. Critically though, the report has noted the need to build synergies and co-operation among the humanitarian agencies rather than the more familiar sense of competition. The developmental pillar envisages attention to the rebuilding and reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure; skills and capacity development in entrepreneurship, private sector participation and actions that in general, guarantee local economic growth. Similarly, the component of good governance goes beyond popular public participation, to include questions of financing and funding as well as environmental sustainability targeting in particular the imminent consequences associated with land degradation and climate change.

In summation, the framework model presented provides for both the theoretical and conceptual analy-

ses as well the necessary evaluation and examination into the root causal factors that various actors can draw from. The fundamental premise of the integrated framework model is that *Boko Haram's* several acts of insurgency are perpetrated by different role players whose combined actions result in four core end-effects; including the violent destruction of human life and property; abduction and trafficking of persons- mostly boy children used as foot soldiers, and girl children used as sex slaves; displacement of persons from their homes and livelihoods; and radicalization of populations through religiously articulated ideological indoctrination and extremist political propaganda. The envisaged intervention measures would include concerted steps to suppress the insurgency; coordinated measures for reconstruction, and resilience building to restore affected communities. Accomplishing these would therefore have to focus on a multiple number of intervention areas. The key indicator variables are thus, on the one hand; what the report presents as 'the quantum factor' of the *Boko Haram* **insurgency,** made up of levels of its recruitment, perpetration and radicalization which all are reflected in the negative impacts; and on the other hand, positively impacting variables such as the levels and intensity of counter-insurgency measures; rehabilitation and reintegration efforts; rebuilding community resilience, depending on degrees of degradation of original resilience levels; and the amount of reconstruction of physical and socio-economic infrastructures in affected regions.

The integrated/nexus framework model therefore captures selected possible mitigation intervention measures against a backdrop of negative and positive dimensions of the insurgency. In a modular sense, the positive impacts would, *ceteris paribus,* net-off the negative direct impacts of the insurgency and corresponding ripple effects, to arrive at what the report qualifies as the *Insurgency Quantum Factor* (IQF). Addressing the insurgency within the context of the IQF, ultimately, sets the stage for an integrated framework and sustainable approach that leverages on the support and working together by all stakeholders in order to rebuild, develop and place the region onto the path to lasting peace and stability; human development for all; and environmental sustainability.

5. Main Conclusions

In general, the study and report has confirmed the dominant view that the *Boko Haram* insurgency and terrorism is deeply rooted in the socio-economic, socio-cultural and political conditions that are then manipulated by religious extremists. In more specific terms, the study and report has also confirmed at least four important facts:

(i) That, there is a significant relationship between perceptions of exclusion, inequality, widespread unemployment, poverty, religious bigotry, Western Education and the consequence of raging conflicts with its associated forms of terror and violence in North East Nigeria;

(ii) That, there is a significant convergence of the consequences of these conflicts and violence on infrastructure; loss of property; unemployment, loss of lives, psychological trauma and the resultant loss of livelihoods;

(iii) That, perceptions of exclusion that extend to health, education, agriculture, developmental infrastructure and other livelihoood amentites, all have a significant nexus with the conflicts and violence in North Eastern Nigeria; and,

(iv) That, it is possible to [re]-conceptualise the way in which the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus operates with a view to integrating crisis response operations by actors in a bid to ensure restoration, rebuilding of institutions as well as reaching sustainable resolutions.

6. Key Messages

In view of the main findings and what the report has established as its conclusions, the following emerge as key messages of the report:

6.1 Prevention is the Penultimate Weapon and Key

This report recommends prevention as the penultimate weapon and anti-dote against conflict, violence and subsequently, humanitarian and development crisis. The most effective way to deal with any potential humanitarian and development crises is to prevent them from occurring in the first place and/

or spreading to nearby and even distant geographic locations. There are, indeed many possible ways through which prevention can be implanted; including the following:

a) *Addressing conclusively, rather than glossing over,* the root causes of the crisis that have been candidly identified in various sections of the report. This would include paying attention to the menace of poverty and deprivation and dealing with the governance deficit that the report has highlighted.

b) *Early detection of potential crisis triggers*, as well as determining the sign posts and tackling the root causes of these triggers. The theoretical premise of putting in place an early warning system complete with periodic evaluation mechanisms has been shown to be effective in reducing losses and casualties from conflict and violence. In the northern part of Nigeria, especially the North Central region, the incessant and frequent farmers-herders conflict, and associated violence and loss of lives, is one such potential trigger that should be conclusively addressed to halt any possible slide into a crisis situation or serve as a fertile ground for the spread of the crisis from its current epicentre- the North East region.

c) *Delinking State from Religion,* is a policy worth pursuing, given what the report has shown to be its negative consequences, noting in particular, the historical origins to the binary schism between the two dominant religions. In its place, the Federal and State governments may want to pursue and encourage social justice on the basis of human equality rather than religious inclination or faith. There is clearly an element of unconstitutionality in the coupling of State and Religion which, at times, tends to play right into the hands of the *Boko Haram* ideology that disparages Western Education and blames it for all and any governmental shortcomings.

d) *Strengthening and decentralising the de-radicalization policy,* arising from the fact that the report has examined, in some detail, the reasons why some people become radicalised and engage violence. It is a fact that many youths in the region have been overly-radicalised and could be ready to take up arms in the defence of causes which the report finds to be essentially, political rather than religious and, in fact, most intrinsically linked to their economic deprivation.

e) *Strengthening the Rule of Law*: there is need for judicial reforms that are necessary in speeding up the processes of litigation and meting out penalties in cases of criminal culpability. Much of the appeal of the *Sharia Courts* hinges on the belief that its judicial process is more efficient than its civil equivalent and hence making the Islamic ideology more attractive to the youth who feel powerless in the hands of the various political and legal arms of government. But it has been noted that this is also a factor fuelling the preponderance of 'jungle justice' because of the lack of faith in the civil judicial system.

f) *Promoting Peace Building and Peace Education Initiatives:* As matter of policy, intensive Peace Building and Peace Education should be vigorously pursued in the area at both formal and informal levels. At the formal level and particularly in schools and colleges and other higher learning institutions, peace education can be incorporated into social studies, religious studies, civic education as well as existing peace and conflict studies. Similarly, traditional institutions can be encouraged to play a role in promoting peace building and education through the establishment of peace centres at ward levels.

6.2 Tackling the Co-joined Problems of Youth Unemployment and Poverty

There is need for deliberate programmes of investment that would increase job creation and employment opportunities for youth who the Report has profiled as being clearly the main sources and tools used in fanning conflict and violence. The Government should in fact engage a deliberate policy on poverty alleviation in the region to reduce the effect of the insurgency over the last few years. The ready

mechanisms for these include soft loans extended to the people for their agricultural production as well as provision of land and security in order to safeguard lives and property. Moreover, government should embrace more and more, the policy of public – private partnership in order to contribute to job creation, poverty alleviation as well as in the provision of basic services and security in the region.

6.3 Investing in Human Capital and Empowerment of Women and Girls

There is need to re-design the education system in the region with a view ensuring equal access while also increasing accessibility of both basic and higher education. This aspect is critical in laying the foundation for much-needed human capital in the region. At the same time specific attention should be given to policies on primary and secondary healthcare delivery with a view to reviving those affected areas and especially the IDP camps across the region and other parts of the country. A strategy that specifically aims at equipping the youth, women and girls with the knowledge and skills needed for effective participation in the development and decision-making processes of their communities is vital in the long run. Notwithstanding the widespread traditional attitudes towards girls and women which discriminate against their participation in and access to education, there is room for promoting their rights to education and health and especially reproductive health. The report considers that according women and the girls the necessary education and skills, as well as space and voice guarantees economic and political empowerment and that this is a key investment in seeking to address the complexes associated with the nexus. In particular, there is a need to stem the tide of early marriage into polygamous unions especially within poor families which are often sponsored through wedding *Fatiha*, leading, subsequently, to large unplanned families often perpetuating a cycle of poverty.

6.4 Re-build better; Re-build Sustainably

The insurgency and violence led to massive destruction of basic infrastructure and as such, priority should be given to infrastructure development in the region in order to enhance socio-economic conditions and improve living standards. Infrastructure development is critical for effective service delivery

and the conduct of economic development activities. Reconstruction of public infrastructures such as dwellings, schools, hospitals, roads and water points will play an important role in rehabilitation and re-integration of affected communities. In so doing, it is important not only to 're-build better', but also to 'rebuild sustainably' and through a process that involves and empowers local communities through skills acquisition and their active participation in the rebuilding and reconstruction process.

6.5 Innovative Funding and Financing Mechanisms

Although funding is almost always never sufficient, it remains a critical component in achieving lasting restoration of communities affected by the insurgency. In this respect, mechanisms for establishing predictable long-term funding covering the entirety of the humanitarian – development continuum and tied to results but with a degree of fungibility is necessary. Even more important is the need to ensure that within the framework of the nexus there is planned movement from reliance on [donor] funding, to local financing, leveraging, as appropriate, from private sector resources. There is, certainly, a compelling business case for greater private sector financing of humanitarian, development and peace initiatives. Only in this way will the response and rebuilding be sustained in the long-run.

6.6 Integrating the Principles of Environmental Sustainability

The crisis response provides a perfect opportunity to begin integrating and mainstreaming environmental sustainability agenda in the region. Addressing waste management, pollution, land degradation and climate change through, for instance climate smart agriculture, clean energy, energy conservation, afforestation; as well as re-charging the waters of the vitally important Lake Chad are all important aspects of the crisis response framework.

6.7 Paving Way for Humanitarian Response and Developmental Initiatives

The conclusive restoration of peace, security and livelihoods while upholding the human rights of all and institutional capacity strengthening are paramount in ushering a new era. There are two important considerations in paving way for a successful humanitarian and development response in the region:

a) **Guaranteeing Safety and Security**: security agencies and humanitarian and development actors should uphold the 'human rights first' principle at all times. Appropriate deployment of the international, national and local community security apparatus is important not just in terms of dealing with the insurgents but also serving as a deterrent measure for any potential radicalised elements. The local security apparatus (Vigilante Groups), in particular, should be rendered, by way of national law, part of local level policing as it has proved to be effective in safeguarding local areas. It has been noted that in instances, insurgency groups appeared to have access to more modern and advanced equipment than the formal security agents. This makes it necessary to renew the thinking of investments in modern security equipment, including assured strategies for staying ahead. Moreover, better synergy and harmonization of all security operations will be necessary given the finding that, in some instances, conflicts among and between respective security agencies was one of the challenges that stood against a united front against the insurgency.

b) **Institutional Capacity Strengthening:** This is a pre-requisite for crisis prevention and response. The specific establishment of *the North East Development Commission* as a dedicated and empowered organ of government saddled with the singular responsibility of developing the region and with a view that all Federal government interventions such as the *Presidential Committee on North East Initiatives* (PCNI), Safe School Initiatives (SSI), Victim's Support Fund (VSF) and other support from partners will be collapsed into the Commission is welcome. It is hoped the initiative will help in putting in place measures that would, among other factors, prevent the escalation and spread of the crisis to other geographic areas.

6.8 Deeper Analysis and Granularity for Better Outcomes

Deeper and granular analysis of comprehensive, reliable, relevant and up-to-date data and information is desirable both for proper identification of the needy and improving the outcomes of the response. In uncovering the humanitarian – development-peace nexus there is a need for finer-analysis of data and information in order to determine and target the most vulnerable and deprived. In this regard, working in close collaboration with, and building capacities of local level institutions in data and information collection, as well as involving the affected populations themselves are key. Upholding the international principle of *subsidiarity* in uncovering the humanitarian- development-peace nexus means and implies the taking of action at the lowest possible levels with strong community involvement on the basis of objectivity, sound evidence and facts.

6.9 Transforming and Turning Adversity into Opportunity

The last decade or so of such a phenomenal crisis presents the North East and Nigeria as a whole, with an opportunity for a new beginning; for a life full of hope and prosperity in line with the *Agenda 2030* aspirations. The *Agenda 2030* should provide the overarching framework for, as well as the principles guiding the humanitarian response and re-integration and reconstruction efforts. The rebuilding, reconstruction and reintegration efforts should not just restore affected populations and communities to their original conditions or status, or indeed build and restore better; but rather should aim at propelling the individuals, households and communities to higher levels of prosperity; including the assurance of a much more dignified living and fulfilment. It is the considered view of this report that the adversity so far experienced in the North East presents an excellent opportunity for the region to begin a journey onto a different path; a path defined by hope and shared prosperity, a path towards sustainable development.

Chapter **1**

Background Context to the Humanitarian, Developmental and Security Challenges in Nigeria's North East

1.1   Introduction

The aim in this chapter is to provide a contextual and broad overview of the background context to the humanitarian, developmental and security challenges that have bedevilled Nigeria's North-East region in the last decade or so; but whose roots certainly go back much further into the more distant history. In presenting the context, it then becomes possible to appreciate the present-day challenges within their broader historical, socio-cultural, ecological, political, developmental and even geographic contexts. The chapter also delves into some of the prevailing governance systems that are implicated in the overall development paradigm and trajectory that the North East has experienced in the recent past. Owing to the prevailing significance of the *Boko Haram* insurgency, the chapter pays particular attention to those socio-cultural, as well as the specific socio-economic factors that appear to have fuelled conflict and violence, and consequently exacerbating the developmental and humanitarian crisis that is discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of the report. The evolution of the causal factors is traced for their persistence over time, along with a determination of their full range and significance alongside what has been billed as the 'ideological' as well as the 'religious persuasion' that has helped foment the crisis. Reference is also made to the role of political power relations and decision-making processes, as well as the societal and institutional structures that are more entrenched in the region and their possible contribution to the conflict and violence and hence, the raging crisis.

1.2   Geographic Location and Basic Demographic Dynamics

1.2.1   National and State Level Demographic Structure

Nigeria has an estimated population of 191 million (51 percent male, 49 percent female) with an estimated growth rate of 2.43 percent per annum and a high dependency ratio of 88 percent (NBS, 2016). The most populous states are Kano (13 million) and Lagos (12.5 million) while the least populous state is Bayelsa with just over 2 million people (NBS, 2016). The population is generally young with an estimated 42 percent of the population being within the 0 -14 years age cohort.

Fig.1.1 ▌ Nigeria Population Structure, 2016

POPULATION (2016)

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016

Fig.1.2 | Nigeria Demography – by State and Sex

POPULATION, NIGERIA (2016)

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016

1.2.2 North East Geography and Demographics

Nigeria's North-East region is one of the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. It comprises the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe with a total estimated population of just over 26 million people (NBS 2016). It is a territory that extends from Lake Chad in the North to the Mambilla Plateau in the South and is bordered by the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary to the East. It shares state boundary with the other Nigerian states of Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau and Benue as seen in figure 1.3 here below. The total area covered by the six states in the North-East zone is about 284,646 square kilometres which constitutes about 30.8 per cent of the total land mass in Nigeria (Dlakwa, 2004). The region has a total of 112 statutorily recognized Local Government Areas (LGAs) which is about 14.47 per cent of the 774 LGAs in Nigeria.

Fig.1.3 | Map of Nigeria Showing the Location of the North-East Region

The table 1.1 here below summarises the population breakdown as well as the ethnic diversity of the North-Eastern region. As is readily evident, Bauchi is the most populous state in the region, closely followed by Borno State while Taraba has the least population of just over 3 million people. In general, the North-East states cover the six states which hitherto, were within what was previously called the North-East State between 1967 and 1976. Adamawa and Taraba

states which hitherto formed Gongola State until 1991, have within themselves several ethnic groups that are estimated to be more than 100. The region is inhabited by diverse ethnic groups each with its own distinct language, but Hausa is a common language in all the six states while Fulfulde (the language of the Fulani) is also widely spoken.

Table 1.1: Population and Ethnic Diversity of the Six States in North-Eastern Nigeria

STATE	POPULATION (2016 estimates)			MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS
	Male	Female	Total	
Adamawa	2166702	2081733	4248435	Bacharna, Chamba, Lunguda, Bulachi, Bare, Kono, Kanakuru, Hunawa, Kilba, Hausa-Fulani, Ganda, Marghi. Higghi etc.
Bauchi	3334030	3203283	6537313	Hausa-Fulani, Karai-karai. Sayawa jarawa, Warji etc.
Borno	2988693	2871489	5860182	Kanuri, Shuwa, Babur-Bura, Marghi, Gwoza, Higghi, Kanakuru, Kibabku, Hausa-Fulani
Gombe	1661050	1595911	3256961	Tangale, Terawa, Hausa-Fulani, Bolewa etc.
Taraba	1564085	1502748	3066833	Jukun Tiv, Mumuye, Kuteb, Hausa- Fulani etc
Yobe	1680009	1614127	3294136	Karai-karai, Ngamo, Mangawa, Ngizimawa, Badawa, Bolewa, Kanuri, Hausa-Fulani, Bura, etc.
GrandTotal	13394569	12869291	26263860	

Population Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics Projections based on National Census 2006; Ethnic Groups Source: Abubakar: 2003:46

In general, Nigeria's North-East is extremely heterogeneous and reflects the diverse ethnic, religious and cultural features of the Nigerian Federation. The people of the region [the north] are generally referred as *"Jama'arArewa,"* meaning, a trans-ethnic community of the North although some of these community groups have considerable internal opposition to the idea of one north informed partly by a perceived non-recognition of cultural pluralism and the projection of some dominant cultures over others.

1.3   The Historical and Political Background of the North East

The history of the North-East region is largely defined by the north region Premiership of Sr. Ahmadu Bello who, on the eve of Nigeria's independence in 1960, established a political community in the northern part of Nigeria to negotiate a power sharing agreement with Nigeria's then other two regions -the east and west regions. The history of the present-day North-East region is also defined by the politics of the Nigerian civil war (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970) and the then prevailing perception of dominance over some minority ethnic groups that informed the 1967 decision by then Colonel Yakubu Gowon (later military President of Nigeria) to dissolve the colonially constructed three regions of the north, east and west Nigeria and in their place create twelve states (*States Creation and Transitional Provision Decree* No. 14 of 1967 of May 27, 1967). As a result of this Decree, the former north region was divided into Benue-Plateau; Kano; Kwara; North-Central; North-Western and the North-Eastern States. The North-Eastern state became an amalgamation of Borno province, the Adamawa *Emirate* taken from the Sokoto Caliphate and the northern Cameroon province which was initially a German colony, but administered as a United Nations Trust Territory after the Germans were defeated in World War II, with the capital located in Maiduguri.

On 3rd February 1976, the North-Eastern state was further divided into three states: Bauchi, Borno and Gongola. Later on, Gombe was curved out of Bauchi; Yobe out of Borno while Gongola was split into Taraba and Adamawa states. Currently, the North-Eastern region is made up of the aforementioned six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe (Fig 1.4). The administration of each of the states is overseen by an Executive Governor who exercises political power, sometimes mobilizing political support along ethnic and religious lines.

Fig.1.4 North East Nigeria showing the six states

1.4 Some Background to Each of the North-East States

Some historical background and geographic features relating to each of the six North East states are briefly summarized here in order to lend clarity to some of the developmental issues discussed in subsequent sections of the report.

1.4.1 Adamawa State

Adamawa State was created on 27th August, 1991 out of the former Gongola State and lies on the South-eastern part of Borno State. Both Adamawa and Borno States have porous borders with Cameroon and Chad which allows for easy movement of arms and cross-border crimes. The strongholds of the *Boko Haram* in Adamawa State are in the mountainous areas of Madagali, Mubi, Uba and Michika with the rough terrains providing ideal hideouts for the insurgents. Topographically, Adamawa is mountainous and is crossed by the large river valleys of Benue, Gongola and Yedsarem with the valleys of the Cameroon, Mandara and Adamawa mountains forming part of the landscape. The major occupation of the people is farming as reflected in their two notable vegetational zones - Sub-Sudan and Northern Guinea Savannah- known for cotton and groundnuts as the main commercial crops while the food crops include maize, yam, cassava, guinea corn, millet and rice. Communities living on the banks of the rivers engage in fishing while others are herdsmen.

Fig.1.5 Adamawa State showing the 21 LGAs

1.4.2 Bauchi State

Bauchi State was created on 3rd February, 1976 out of the former North Eastern State and occupies a total land area of 49,119 km² representing about 5.3 per cent of Nigeria's total land mass. The state is bordered by seven states of Kano and Jigawa to the north, Taraba and Plateau to the south, Gombe and Yobe to the east and Kaduna to the west. Bauchi state is one of the states in the northern part of Nigeria that spans two distinctive vegetation zones; i.e. the Sudan savannah and the Sahel savannah with the former covering the southern part where it gets richer (agriculturally), especially along water sources and the latter (also known as a semi-desert vegetation) manifest from the middle of the state as one moves to the north, comprising mainly of isolated stands of thorny shrubs. The southwestern part of the state is mountainous as a result of the continuation of the Jos Plateau, while the northern part is generally sandy. The level of illiteracy and poverty is very high in the State and it has witnessed several *Boko Haram* attacks particularly within the metropolis.

Fig.1.6 Bauchi State showing the 20 LGAs

1.4.3 Borno State

Borno State was created on 3rd February, 1976 out of the former North Eastern State. Maiduguri, the state capital is reputed to be the birth place and headquarters of *Boko Haram.* Culturally, the state is heterogeneous but with the Kanuri as the undoubted majority. In spite of their numerical strength in the state and across the entire Lake Chad region, the Kanuri experienced a reversal of political fortunes after the re-establishment of democracy in 1999 and are yet to regain similar status under the new democratic dispensation (Lewis, Robinson and Rubin, (1998). The rough terrain, such as mountains and dense forests, provide safe havens for insurgents and have periodically prompted deadly clashes along the border with Cameroon's army. The Sambisa forest, in particular, serves as a major sanctuary for insurgents and has been used by *Boko Haram* to avoid capture. The Mountain ranges in Northern Cameroon also fulfil a similar function, with the added benefit of being inaccessible to the Nigerian military in the initial stages of the insurgency. Illiteracy and poverty are also very high. For various reasons that are both historical, internal and external, Borno state has been the epicentre of the *Boko Haram* rampage.

Fig.1.7 Borno State showing the 27 LGAs

1.4.4 Gombe State

Gombe State was created on October 1, 1996, out of the former Bauchi State and is multi-ethnic in its composition with the dominant Tangale tribe inhabiting the southern part of the State. The other ethnic groups are the Igala, Waja, Fulani and Hausa with their separate cultural as well as ethnic identities. The State also comprises other minority ethnic groups such as the Bolewa, Kanuri, Dadiya and Waja who occupy a sizeable part of some remote areas of the state. The state capital of Gombe is a reflection of the heterogeneous composition of the state. Its location in the North Eastern zone, right within the expansive savannah, allows the state to share common borders with the Borno state, Yobe, Taraba, Adamawa and Bauchi states. It has an area of 20,265 km² and an estimated population of 3.3 million people as of 2016. Gombe has two distinct climates: the dry season (November–March) and the rainy season (April–October) with an average rainfall of 850mm. Although Gombe remains one of the most stable areas in the North East region, it is as vulnerable to the violence given that it shares boundaries with Borno and Yobe states.

Fig.1.8 Gombe State showing the 11 LGAs

1.4.5 Taraba State

Taraba State was created on 27th August, 1991 out of the former Gongola State and is bordered in the west by Nasarawa State and Benue State; in the northwest by Plateau State; north by Bauchi State and Gombe State; northeast by Adamawa State; east and south by Cameroon. The state lies largely within the middle of Nigeria and consists of an undulating landscape dotted with a few mountainous features that include the scenic and prominent Mambilla Plateau. Most of the state is within the tropical zone of low forest vegetation in the southern part and grassland in the northern parts. The Mambilla Plateau with an altitude of 1,800 meters above sea level has a temperate climate all year round. The rivers Benue, Donga, lau Taraba and Ibi are the main rivers in the state, arising from the Cameroonian mountains and stretching almost the entire length of the state in a general North-South direction to link up with the river Niger. Historically, Taraba state has had the least number of *Boko Haram* attacks in the zone.

Fig.1.9 Taraba State showing the 16 LGAs

1.4.6 Yobe State

Yobe State was created on 27th August, 1991 out of the former Borno State and shares borders with three states: to the eastern boundary with Borno State; to the West is Jigawa and Bauchi States while to the North is the international border with Niger Republic. Yobe covers an area of about 45,502 Km² with a population of about 3.3 million people (2016 population census projections). Because the state lies mainly in the dry savanna belt, conditions are hot and dry for most of the year, except in the southern part where the climate is much more mild. Whereas Yobe state is an agricultural state, it also has rich fishing grounds and mineral deposits of gypsum in the Fune LGA, kaolin, and quartz. The state's agricultural products include gum arabic, groundnuts, beans, and cotton and it is reported to have one of the largest cattle markets in West Africa, located in Potiskum. The state however continues to register very high rates of illiteracy and poverty. The major ethnic group in Yobe are Kanuri, while other ethnic communities include Ngizim, Karai-Karai, Bolewa, Bade, Hausa, Ngamo, Shuwa, Fulani (Bura), and Maga.

Fig.1.10 Yobe State showing the 17 LGAs

1.5   Land Degradation and Loss of Livelihoods

The North East region occupies the Sahel - Savannah belt on the southern fringes of the Sahara Desert, the area most affected by desertification and land degradation. Nicholson *et al* (1998) have described this zone as the most "ecologically unstable" in the world, a phenomenon explained by Zeng and Neelin (2000) as arising from the fact that these grassland ecosystems try to smoothen large climatic variability between the (Sahara) desert to the north and the rain forest to the south, thus creating a state of unsteadiness in-between. Although Desertification has been defined as a land degradation process in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including climate variation and human activities (UN, 1994), some authorities prefer to distinguish desertification as simply being "the expansion of desert-like conditions and landscapes to areas where they should not occur climatically (Graetz, 1991) while land degradation is exemplified by the replacement of diverse and nutrient-rich plant species with vegetation of poorer quality due to reduced soil quality (Nicholson, 2001). Land uses such as tree felling for fuel wood and timber; pasture and crop production; and agricultural 'extensification' and intensification have all been cited as important contributors to land degradation in Africa. Badejo (1998) suggested that land use change has impacted the northern ecosystems of Nigeria over the years leading to a perceived creeping of the savannah into the tropical rain forest zone. Using the Sahelian Land Use Model (SALU), Taylor *et al* (2002) measured the changes in percent land use in Northern Nigeria over a 54-year (1961-2015) period. The results revealed the existence of an inverse relationship between the land under forest cover and land used for pasture and crops with a continuous decrease in forest cover and increase in land area used for pasture and cropland over this period. This situation, they aver, could possibly have grave environmental and climatic consequences over time, since forests, among many other functions such as carbon sequestration, act as nutrient pumps into ecosystems and preserve water in case of low rainfall. The findings of Taylor, *et al,* based on changes in land use in effect, confirmed gradual degradation of the land in Northern Nigeria over time.

Table 1.2: Percent land use in Northern Nigeria using the SALU

Land Use Type	1961	1996	2015
Forest	72	40	35
Pasture	14	16	17
Cropland	5	14	22
Fallow	9	16	15
Unused	0	13	11

— Source: Taylor et al ((2002)

Prior to independence and immediately thereafter, the North-East region enjoyed a comparative advantage in agriculture and thus acted as the bread basket for the rest of the country. However, the 1970s oil boom redirected the focus of the economy and deprived the region of the investment needed to transition into large-scale commercial and sustainable agriculture. Simultaneously, desertification, land degradation and the adverse impacts of climate change began to deprive the region of its agricultural potential and means of livelihood. The sum total of all these is that through a combination of anthropogenic and climatic factors the region's natural resource endowments have become systematically depleted. A classical case of resource depletion is the Lake Chad which provides water for and is a source of livelihood to a population of 30 million people across the four countries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria whose water became

depleted by up to 90% over the past three decades as depicted by satellite images in fig 1.11 below.

Receding Waters of the Lake Chad 1972 (left) and 2007 (right)

Source:https://www.google.com/search?q=receding+water+of+lake+chad&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=
0ahUKEwjvp_n4k4DcAhUlZVAKHeQXC2oQsAQIJA&biw=1391&bih=690#imgrc=pRkw1-SbgCDwdM:&spf=1530525749600

The effects of limited development of the agricultural sector and the degradation of the natural environment have been exacerbated by failure to develop alternative industries given the limited infrastructure and the lack of human capital in the region.

1.6 Religious Contests and Anti-Western Influence in the North East

The North East region is well known for a fairly long period of well-documented religious contestations. These contests, including the intermittent conflicts around religious supremacy and dominance, in addition to their recurrent ethnic manifestations have evolved through the various historical epochs, implicating as many actors and resulting in distinct outcomes that can roughly be clustered around six themes.

1.6.1 The Abiding Influence of the 19th Century 'Jihad'

With a predominantly Muslim population, the *jihad* war that was fought by the famed Sheik Usman Dan Fodio in the early 19th century (Hickey, 1984) is illustrative. Usman Dan Fodio is reported to have waged the *jihad* or religious war against what he described as the un-Islamic and corrupt ruling elite leading to the establishment of the *Sharia*-governed Sokoto Caliphate. Joel (2014) has stated that the spread of Islam across the North-East states can be traced to that 19th Century *jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio, which also led to their incorporation into the Caliphate

and the institutionalization of the *Emirate* (and later Native Authority under colonization) type of rule. The process of incorporation and its consolidation by the colonialists through "Indirect Rule" however, led to misunderstandings and mistrust within and between diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups. The subsequent assertion of separate ethnic identities, coupled with the religious and newly emergent political contests as well as the competition over the control of productive resources among themselves are potential sources of the violent conflict in the North-East area (Abubakar, 2003). Indeed, the very emergence of *Boko Haram* reflects a long history of the militant type of the Islamic religion in northern Nigeria which forms a core part of the movement of restoration (Agbiboa, 2013). Moreover, the late 1970s and early 1980s marked the beginning of a period of agitation for *Sharia* law to be adopted across Nigeria as result of which *Sharia* law was adopted in twelve northern states between 1999 and 2001. The emergence of *Boko Haram,* which relies on violence ought therefore to be viewed within the broader context of this restoration since the overriding goal continues to be the enforcement of *Sharia* law.

1.6.2 The Quest for a Puritanical Brand of Islam in the Post-colonial Era

The *jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio has been viewed, in some quarters, as a war for religious purification and the search for a political kingdom (Crowder, 1978; ICG, 2010) with the outcome being that it has remained fundamental for the legitimacy of the northern ruling class (Udoidem, 1997). The ruling class saw the British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, and its subsequent dealings with colonial and post-colonial states as bringing about the corrupting influence of secular political power (Agbiboa, 2013; Falola, 1998) and hence the resistance, ever since, to Western Education by some Muslims (Marchal, 2012). For instance, northern Nigeria in December 1980 experienced a violent confrontation between an Islamist sect known as *Maitatsine* and the Nigerian Police Force in Kano which extended to Maiduguri in October 1982; to Yola in 1984, Gombe in 1985, Potiskum riots in 1994 and Jalingo 1992 (Abubakar, 2003). Scholars such as Hickey (1984), opine that the *Maitatsine* uprisings had their roots in the deeply conservative practice of Islam which has been dominant in the region since Usman Dan Fodio's *jihad*. Muhammed Marwa the leader of *Maitatsine* was an Islamic scholar who believed that Islam had come under the corrupting influence of westernization and the formation of the modern state (Agbiboa, 2013). The *Maitatsine* had gone to the extent of rejecting Muslims who had, in their eyes, gone astray; lived in secluded areas to avoid mixing with mainstream Muslims and rejected material wealth on the grounds that it was associated with Western values.

1.6.3 Rebellion Against Western Education and Influence

European intervention in Africa and the subsequent colonization of Nigeria brought about resistance against Western Education, especially in the Muslim dominated areas. In a sense, it is this fact that accounts for the low educational attainment in the northern parts of the country. In contrast, Western Education was generally welcomed in the southern territories. The historical Northern resistance to Western Education was premised on the understanding that Muslims had a parallel system; i.e. an Islamic Education in the form of the Qur'anic school *(makarantar allo)* and advanced knowledge school *(makarantar ilmi),* which had flourished for centuries. From this perspective, Western Education was seen as an attack on the existing system given that it was introduced by Christian missionaries as a means for evangelism. Accordingly, those who went to the schools providing Western Education known as *makarantar boko* were regarded with no respect and earned the derisive name: *'yan boko'*

or simply, 'western-educated' (Salihi, 2012). But the early generation of *'yan boko'* in Northern Nigeria were not entirely uprooted from their Muslim traditional background which included Islamic education. Equipped with Western Education, they were to provide the manpower for the civil service and all other modern professions including political leadership. In fact, they were to establish the legacies of meritorious service and exemplary life for the region, in spite of the latent undercurrents.

1.6.4 The Failed Promise of Western Education

The later generation of beneficiaries of Western Education in the north did not however, offer the demeanour and the opportunities of the pioneers. The political instability and economic hardship experienced since the advent of the 1980s coupled with other problems, including the diminishing capacity of government to deliver basic services and ensure prosperity led to frustration, deeply held grievances and unlike the initial stage when *boko* was suspect because of its evangelization credentials, it became despised for its failure to meet the expectations of many, in terms of the prospects for a better form of education, employment and other opportunities. More fundamentally, the wanton corruption and culpability of its products were then related directly to the problems of the country as a whole (Salihi, 2012). This background is particularly relevant to the emergence of *Boko Haram*, besides its identity as an Islamist group (Isa 2010, Egwu 2011).

1.6.5 The Colonial Principle of Indirect Rule and Religious Contest

In addition to the foregoing, it is to be recalled that the British colonial administrators, through the process of 'Indirect Rule' put several non-Moslem community enclaves under the administration of the *Emirs* while at the same time, perhaps paradoxically, the indigenous groups of these areas were being converted to Christianity and not Islam which was the religion of the *Emirs.* The journey of the inhabitants of such enclaves to Christianity thus ensured that they got Western Education and with it, power through the holding of state positions. This implied the gaining of power, legitimacy and freedom. This narrative corroborates with Idahosa's (2015) findings; that whereas socio-economic factors facilitated the radicalization and politicization of religious sects in the North East, the fundamental factor is also the fear of domination and hence the fight for supremacy. The emergence of *Boko Haram* is therefore sometimes understood within this context of a perception of possible future dominance of one religion over the other.

1.6.6 The Effects of Latter-day Calls for a Universal Jihad

The emergence of *Boko Haram* also benefitted from the global developments following the Tuesday September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States when there were, in some quarters, an anti-Western campaign and calls for a universal *jihad.* In spite of widespread global condemnation against the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States (US), there were celebrations in some parts of Nigeria. To complicate matters, the military campaigns by 'the coalition forces' in some parts of the world which commenced immediately after the attack coincided with a period of general economic hardships and low levels of development in Nigeria that inadvertently created the ideal environment for *Boko Haram* to capitalize on. In line with this, several conspiracy theories emerged linking *Boko-Haram* with some external forces and as a symptom of Nigeria as a failed state (Atim, 2014).

1.7   Proliferation of Arms and Ammunition

The proliferation of small arms and ammunition has also been put forward as a cause of the *Boko Haram* insurgency. Kashim (2012) asserts that the peculiar geo-political setting of Borno state's neighbouring three countries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger in a sub-region generally known for political upheaval, insecurity, religious extremism and terrorism is an important predisposing factor. The relatively higher level of arms and ammunition in the North-East axis can be attributed to the instability and armed conflict experienced in some neighbouring African countries. Being the gateway to Nigeria from North and Central Africa and given the porous nature of the international borders with Chad, Cameroon and Niger, Borno and Yobe states have served as a natural route for illegal persons, arms and ammunition. This situation could greatly have assisted the cause of the *Boko Haram.*

1.8   The Emergence of Boko Haram

It is instructive to note that prior to the advent of British colonization, the current region of North-eastern Nigeria was a territory under the sovereign control of the Bornu Empire composed of a majority of Kanuri-Muslims. However, the imposition of British control contributed to an increased allegiance of the local people to the Bornu Sultanate, as well as profound dissatisfaction with the activities of the British authorities. This contributed to the rise of fundamentalism and could help to explain aspects of the genesis of sympathy and popular support for *Boko Haram* among the local Kanuri people (Olojo, 2013). It is in agreement with Olojo (2013), that Atim (2014) thus suggests that the territory currently under *Boko Haram* sphere of influence was a sovereign constitutional Republic or Sultanate with majority Kanuri Muslim population. But unlike the Sokoto Sultanate, the Bornu Sultanate was run according to the principles of the constitution of Medina. The Bornu Sultanate was thus distinct from the Sokoto Caliphate with the former emerging after the overthrow of the Kanem- Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years

Boko Haram, a Hausa phrase meaning 'Western Education is forbidden' or 'Western Education is sinful' is the name commonly used to refer to the organization *'Ahlisunnah Lidda'awati wa'l-Jihad'*, or the 'People Committed for the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'. The movement has its origins in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. The name gained popularity in the early 2000s and although now widely used and popularized by the media, it does not adequately capture the real objective of the movement, which was and is, to overthrow the secular government, and establish an Islamic state run under *Sharia* law with assurance of ridding the territory of Western influences. The movement rejects Western civilization at large and upholds the superiority of Muslim civilization. After a period of relative 'low activity', the group re-emerged in 2010 and since then, its attacks have grown in intensity and scope precipitating the current humanitarian and development crisis in North East Nigeria. The cumulative impact of *Boko Haram* in terms of the deaths alone between 2011 and 2018 is partially captured in figure 1.12 herebelow. But the movement has since spread its activities not only to the entire North-East but also to other parts of Nigeria and across the borders into Cameroon, Chad and Niger effectively covering the entire Lake Chad basin region. The movement has therefore become the most significant security and development challenge facing the entire Lake Chad Basin.

Fig.1.12 Cumulative Deaths by Boko Haram 2011-2018

Cumulative Deaths

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

1.9   Conclusion

In essence, this chapter has introduced and attempted to locate the historical origins to the crisis that is raging in Nigeria's North East. It has chronicled the basic historical, ecological, socio-cultural as well as the more contemporary sources of grievance that have fuelled the crisis. The North East as a region has also been profiled in order to highlight some of its significant demographic, climatic and developmental contexts. In the next chapter, an attempt will now be made to provide a more in-depth look at each of the critical causal factors with a view to laying bear the significant effects and consequences that have in essence, amounted to an atrocious and cruel affront to the Human Development indices of the North East generally.

Chapter 2

An Assessment of the Root Causal Factors of the Crisis

2.1   Introduction

The basic aim in this chapter is to provide a more pragmatic assessment of the root causal factors that have fuelled the crisis in the North East region and more so during recent times. It is to be appreciated at the outset, that although most of the directly relevant root causal factors have been identified and outlined in the preceding chapter, their specific contributions and respective impact in the context of overall Human Development in the North East region have not been assessed. The intention here is therefore, to attempt a slightly more deepened analysis, by drawing from the various survey findings and also cross-referencing these with the literatures and other sources in order to establish how specific root causal factors have had quite an impact on the general populace; on human development in particular, and how all these have in turn exacerbated what has, ultimately, become a major developmental and humanitarian crisis.

2.2   Poverty, Deprivation and Low Human Development

2.2.1   Rising Poverty and Income Inequality

In a recent publication, the World Bank has reported all the six regions of Nigeria, with the exception of the North East registered a decline in the poverty incidence. Simply put, the poverty headcount index, over the 2004 – 2013 period (World Bank, 2016) has declined. Using the 2004 poverty line of ₦28,830 a year deflated temporally using the national consumer price index provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and spatially using zonal-level price data, the report shows that the South West region performed particularly well and managed to cut the poverty rate by more than half during this period, while poverty levels remained particularly high in the North East and North West regions at 47.6 percent and 59.0 percent, respectively. Importantly, the North East was the only region to have registered an increase in the incidence of poverty from 45.56 percent to 47.56 percent over this period. Unsurprisingly, the region also had a shrinking middle class and the largest increase in income inequality, as measured by the *Gini Coefficient*, over this period.

Fig.2.1 ▏ Changes in Poverty Headcount ratio by region – 2004-2013

— Source: World Bank calculations based on NLSS 2003–04 and GHS 2010–11, 2012–13

Fig.2.2 | Changes in percent middle income 2004-2013

Middle Class Households by zone, 2004, 2013

— Source: World Bank calculations based on NLSS 2003–04 and GHS 2010–11, 2012–2013

Fig.2.3 | Gini Coefficient Changes 2004 -2013

GINI Coefficient by zone 2004, 2013

— Source: World Bank calculations based on NLSS 2003–04 and GHS 2010–11, 2012–13

2.2.2 High Levels of Multiple Deprivation

Beyond the money metric poverty measure presented in the preceding section, in general terms, practically all recent evaluations have confirmed that northern Nigeria, especially the North-East region, is the most deprived part of the Nigerian federation. According to the Oxford Poverty Human Development Initiative (OPHDI, 2017), the North of Nigeria is most conspicuous for the flaming red indicators showing the highest incidence of deprivation as measured by the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) across various domains with the most deprived state being Yobe with an MPI of 0.635, followed closely by Zamfara state with an MPI of 0.605. This is in stark contrast to the situation in the South West which has two of the least deprived States – Lagos and Osun, with MPIs of 0.035 and 0.043, respectively.

Fig.2.4 | Multidimensional Poverty Index – OPHDI 2017

Nigeria MPI
0.303

The Oxford study used indicators of assets, cooking fuel, floor, drinking water, sanitation and electricity while the others were nutrition and child mortality as well as school attendance and years of schooling. More recently, UNDP Nigeria in collaboration with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in a study commissioned as part of the production of this report (see Annex 2) has undertaken a more contextualised computation of the MPI at the sub-national level leading to pretty much similar results, albeit with different rankings of the states as shown in fig 2.5 below. In this most recent UNDP Nigeria/NBS computation the indicators used included assets, cooking fuel, floor type, source of water, sanitation, source of lighting, child mortality, child school attendance, years of schooling and importantly, unemployment.

Fig.2.5 State level Multidimensional Poverty Index – UNDP 2018

The UNDP Nigeria/NBS computation also shows that the intensity of poverty, which measures the percentage of dimensions in which poor people are deprived is highest in northern Nigeria with the North East at 44 percent, just one percentage point below the North-West region where the intensity of poverty is 45 percent and three percentage points above the North central region where the intensity of poverty is 41 percent.

Fig.2.6 Intensity of Poverty by region

2.2.3 Low Human Development

The North-East region also lags other regions in terms of overall Human Development. Human development is about people expanding their choices; and being able to live full and creative lives, with freedom and dignity. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of human progress which takes into consideration the average achievements in three basic dimensions of human development; a long and healthy life; access to knowledge and a decent standard of living across geographic areas and over time. The recently UNDP Nigeria/NBS computed HDI, at state level, shows that Nigeria has an average HDI of 0.521. All the North East states have HDI scores below the national average; ranging from a high of 0.4286 in Taraba to a low of 0.3238 in Bauchi, a figure less than half that of Lagos state at 0.6515, the state with the highest HDI score (see Annex 2 for detailed State level HDI computations).

Fig.2.7 State level Human Development Index – UNDP 2018

These findings from different surveys carried out over diverse time periods are corroborated by the findings of a field survey undertaken across the North East States to gauge respondents' perception of the status of socio-economic development and the drivers of the prevailing crisis (see section on study methodology). As can be seen from Table 2.1 below, some 43 percent of the population have a household size of 1- 4; 34 percent, 5-9; 15 percent have 10-15 household size while 8 percent of the households have 16 members or more. The implication of all these is that

the average household size in the North East region is between 4 and 9 except for Gombe State which has an average household size of 1-4. By any measure, these are large size households which at the very outset require significant resources to ensure their basic survival.

The field study also confirmed the significant co-relationship between the low attainments in the basic indicators of socio-economic development and the evidently large household sizes. Thus, for instance the figure 2.8 here below shows that an average of 46.3 percent of respondents across the North-East states reported the low life expectancy of between 31 and 40; while about 41 percent reported a life expectancy of between 40 and 59; and 12.2 percent as 60 and above with the overall implication being that for a significant number of people in the area, life expectancy is between 31 and 40 and further highlighting the deficiency of health facilities and related services in the area.

Table 2.1: Household Size of Respondents

State	Household Size	Responses	Percentage	State	Household Size	Responses	Percentage
Adamawa	1-4	32	53		16-above	00	00
	5-9	26	43		Total	60	10
	10-15	02	03	Taraba	1-4	16	27
	16-above	00	00		5-9	20	34
	Total	60	100		10-15	13	13
Bauchi	1-4	15	15		16-above	11	18
	5-9	19	32		Total	60	100
	10-15	20	34	Yobe	1-4	27	45
	16-above	06	10		5-9	28	47
	Total	60	100		10-15	05	08
Bornu	1-4	30	50		16-above	00	00
	5-9	18	30		Total	60	100
	10-15	10	17	Grand	1-4	156	43
	16-above	02	03		5-9	123	34
	Total	60	100		10-15	54	15
Gombe	1-4	36	60		16-above	27	08
	5-9	20	34		Total	360	100
	10-15	04	07				

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

Fig.2.8 Perceptions about average Life Expectancy in the families in the North- Eastern States (%)

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

2.3   Unemployment and Underemployment

Women and young people are often victims of multiple and interlocking forms of discrimination and exclusion that can lead to an imbalance of power that excludes them from participating in economic development and affairs that affect them, ultimately undermining their needs and aspirations. As shown in fig 1.1 Nigeria has a significant "youth bulge", with an estimated 83 percent of the population below the age of 40 years while 62 percent are below the age of 25 years. But whether the "youth bulge" constitutes a threat depends largely on the degree to which youth are included in economic, social, and political life; and the extent to which they can access opportunities for education and socio-economic mobility.

Unemployment which has been on a general upward trend in the recent past has discernable gender and spatial dimensions with the youth, women and those living in rural areas disproportionately affected as shown in figures 2.9 to 2.13 below. Instructively, unemployment is highest among those with the highest level of educational attainment (post-secondary education) which, as is observed in the proceeding sections leads to a sense of frustration and poverty, especially among the educated.

Fig.2.9 | Unemployment Trends (2010-2016)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.10 | Under- and Unemployment by Age Group – Q3-2017

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.11 Under-and Unemployment by Gender – Q3-2017

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.12 Under- and Unemployment by Place of Residence – Q3-2017:

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Fig.2.13 Under-and Unemployment by Educational Attainment – Q3-2017

—Source: National Bureau of Statistics

The basic pattern of the NBS generated statistics appear to have also been vindicated from the field survey undertaken in the course of producing this report. The figure 2.14 here below, for instance, shows that an average of 76.78 percent of respondents surveyed in the six states agreed that youth unemployment has contributed to the *Boko Haram* insurgency while 20.28 percent disagreed. In Yobe state, Adamawa and Gombe, this co-relationship is particularly distinct; with the former (Yobe), actually reflecting that nearly 100 percent of the survey respondents agreed that youth unemployment is a major factor accounting for the insurgency. This general perception suggests that widespread youth unemployment cannot be meaningfully delinked from the insurgency in the North East given too, that "an idle mind is the devils workshop" as the old adage goes.

Fig.2.14 Perceptions of Relationship Between Youth Unemployment and Insurgency (%)

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

In essence, the foregoing sections reveal that poverty in the North East is widespread and hence confirming what has been described as a 'failed promise' that many Nigerians had hoped for particularly at the advent of independence. Commenting on this perception of failure back in August 2009, former US Secretary of State, Ms Hillary Clinton attributed the problem associated with the rise of conflict in Nigeria to the disconnect between Nigeria's wealth and poverty in the rural communities. According to her, "the lack of transparency and accountability had eroded the legitimacy of government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state" (Clinton, 2009:1). In an apparent concurrence with Ms Clinton, Mallam Hussaini Salisu, an Islamic cleric has asserted:

> The level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for activities of *Boko Haram...* their conduct is totally un-Islamic but the whole problem boils down to the failure of government at all levels to make the welfare of the citizenry a priority, a nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people seek relief in religion (Tell, August 10, 2009:38).

In his contribution to an analysis of the root causes of *Boko Haram,* Adetiloye (2014), opined that where there is a wide gap between the rich and the poor, class conflicts will always occur. In addition, the arrogant display of ostentatious wealth by the elitist class which the majority

seem to regard as having been illegally acquired creates hatred (Adetiloye (2014). This line of thought is shared by Nwagu (2014) who also attributes the cause of the insurgency to the control of valuable resources by powerful people who deny the less privileged access, with the disadvantaged segments resorting to fighting for what they believe belongs to them. Insurgency in this context arises because a group decides that the gap between their political expectations and the opportunities afforded them is unacceptable and this can only be remedied by force (Metz, 2007).

2.4 Perceived Systematic Exclusion and Structural Inequality

Nigeria also appears to have borne the full brunt of many years of neglect and structural inequalities stemming largely from the failure to address deplorable living conditions and lack of economic opportunities, particularly in the North East. As the state continued to retreat and the economy dwindled, the country got caught up with a small elite that was deeply steeped in conspicuous consumption at the expense of the majority. In the midst of widespread and abundant poverty, a fertile environment was thus created for *Boko Haram* to thrive (Kashim, 2012). Adeyemi (2006) has attributed this state of affairs to a lack of political legitimacy to which he proceeds to peg most of the crises and especially, the inability to bring about genuine development that responds adequately to the needs and aspirations of the masses. He thus opines that tribalism and the manipulation of religious sentiments, as well as regionalism have been used to justify unequal development.

The feeling of being unequally treated has fomented frustration and could further lead to rebellion (Nwagu, 2014). It is to say that the effects of frustration nurtures rebellion and apathy among the majority of the citizenry and brings about insurgency, restiveness, terrorism, violence and such like anti-social activities. In such unhealthy environments, people tend to identify more closely with their religious beliefs for all manner of reasons; including a desire to gain support; rise against the system; mobilise politically or for their own security. Whereas the result is quite often the alienation from others on the basis of religious faith, the fact remains that such beliefs will only have been driven by hatred, anger, bitterness and envy which therefore provide fodder for rebellion. The classic case in point here is the situation which obtained in Maiduguri from 2009 to 2013 when, a feeling of exclusion; envy and jealously appears to have been among the drivers of the conflict. Some local communities left their business premises (shops, workshops, warehouses and other places) with claims that 'non-indigenes' had dominated businesses and lucrative offices leaving them in poverty.

> It is to say that the effects of frustration nurtures rebellion and apathy among the majority of the citizenry and brings about insurgency, restiveness, terrorism, violence and such like anti-social activities. In such unhealthy environments, people tend to identify more closely with their religious beliefs for all manner of reasons; including a desire to gain support; rise against the system; mobilise politically or for their own security.

2.5 Use of Religion as a Tool for Economic and Political Mobilisation

Idahosa (2015) has suggested that the activities of *Boko Haram* could well be understood from the perspective of the gridlock between religion and the State. He cites in this regard, claims and counter claims of complicity that are traded between the political parties that have been at the centre of political power in Nigeria and which apparently would put religion on the backseat of causative factors. In thus accepting the view that *Boko Haram* has political connections, a study by Mbaya (2013) revealed some of these uneasy political implications of the *Boko Haram* insurgency in Maiduguri (see table 2.2 below). As can be seen from the table 2.2, some 38.6 percent of the respondents surveyed were of the view that the political implications of *Boko Haram* in Maiduguri caused the rampant killings of political opponents and disenfranchised many.

Table 2.2: People Perceptions of the political implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Maiduguri

Implications	(%) of respondents
• Manipulation of election results • Forcing people to vote for candidates against their choice • Using threats and assaults against political opponents and the electorate	26
• Assassination and killing of political opponents and the electorate • Rampant political killings under the disguise of Boko Haram • Destruction and burning of political party offices	38.6
• Brought incompetent leadership • Brought unpopular candidates into power • Masses are being alienated from having access to electoral positions	19.4
• Threat to democratization in Nigeria • Political intolerance • increase apathy towards voting	5.6
• Post-election violence • Voting without choosing • No confidence in election results	10.4
Total	100

—Source: Adapted from Mbaya, 2013

Given the foregoing, it becomes apparent that religious affiliation can play a significant role in the overall quest for social solidarity. In his discussion on the role of religion in Nigerian's body polity, Adeyemi (2006) opined that the power of religion as a tool of political manoeuvring is very fundamental as manifested in various religious crises across the country. In the words of Atim (2014), there is a vital link between religious crises and the socio-cultural; political and economic predicament of the North East. A cogent example was the 1980, 1982 and 1984 *Maitatsine* uprising in Kano; Maiduguri; Jimeta, Yola and Gombe respectively, where it was established that the majority followers of *Maitatsine* were hawkers, the jobless and peasants who in the absence of any societal security had to take cover under *Maitatsine* for a living (Adibe, 2012).

In addition, Atim (2014), has observed that any frustrated individual can easily take the garb of religion in order to protest against a prevailing social order. Atim (2014) thus suggests that Nigeria's dilemma stems from the fact that mischief makers who are out to control the national cake believe that religion could be the most effective tool to use to their successful advantage. Thus, it is in the interest of the various religious groups to use religion in order to climb up the power rungs or in the event of failure to take direct control; they must control those in authority so that their economic and political base is adequately protected. In this process, religious groups resort to intimidation and the use of force in order to create fear and insecurity thereby threatening the very foundations of the society. According to Olojo (2013) religion appears to be the language of politics and is then exploited by both state and non-state actors towards ends that are essentially parochial and self-serving.

Contributing further to this discourse, Elden (2009), attempted to link the September 11 terrorist attacks targeted at US interests to the proliferation of religious crisis in Nigeria. According to him, it was the message broadcasted on 11th February 2003 that informs an understanding of why certain countries such as Nigeria were experiencing violence. In the said broadcast, Muslim nations that were not operating *Sharia* law were roundly criticised and called upon to liberate themselves through a *jihad*. The question may well be asked as to why such messages resonated more in northern Nigeria and not in other parts of Nigeria and in other parts of Africa. The answer to this could simply be that the structural economic inequalities had already provided a strong foundation within which the prevailing religious sentiment and affiliations could be easily exploited and ignited. It is therefore instructive to note that it is along these lines that *Boko Haram* continues to advocate for the replacement of the Nigerian Federation with a pure *Sharia* state; notwithstanding that this is contrary to Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which clearly states that *"the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State religion"*.

Even thus from these cursory observations, it may be concluded that the fundamental problem then is not the secular state, *per se,* but rather, the inability to transform the secular nature of the Nigerian state into the desired and practical reality of good governance, shared opportunities and excellent service delivery. Moreover, the dilemma is also a product of the inability to squarely separate religion from state policy given that the general position would be that religious matters are entirely personal and would have nothing to do with government.

In an earlier contribution to the debate, Bala Usman maintained that violence in the garb of religion has always been a manipulation of the elite and the political class. He questioned the link between violence and Islamic fundamentalism, by posing the questions:

> What are they actually fanatical about? What beliefs, values and practices in contemporary Nigeria are they specifically fanatically opposed to or in support of? What exactly in the Islamic faith and practice in the contemporary world do they regard as so fundamental as to determine all their actions so totally and exclusive" (Usman, 1987, 73) cited in Danjibo, (2009).

Usman thus refused to accept the fact that it was fanaticism that drove the *Maitatsine* sect into violent demonstrations given that it is not just the Muslims youths that were hit by the economic hardships in the country. Concurring that the lack of education and employment among the youth in the North East is the cause of violence, Atim (2014), argues that those engaged in the *Boko Haram* violence are mostly jobless and without skills or trade and hence no sources of livelihood. Commenting further, Atim noted that the youth constitute over

70 percent of the population of Nigeria and yet over 60 percent of them lack jobs or better opportunities and hence, a relationship between mass poverty as a result of bad governance on one hand and frustration and violence on the other hand. Conclusively, it can be said that religion by itself may not be the problem or cause of the crisis in northern Nigeria other than its destructive exploitation by *Boko Haram* and turning it into a key driver of public support for violence. This point is perhaps crucial in providing a nuanced understanding of how the cause of conflict is not, essentially, the mere presence of the factor of religion but rather when this factor, individually or collectively along with others, is manipulated in favour or disfavour of certain political and economic interests.

But the foregoing notwithstanding, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the *Boko Haram* insurgency is also fuelled by distinct ideological factors which are usually connected to religion. The role of religion as already highlighted in the preceding section is certainly significant due to its specific position in Nigerian society and politics. Indeed, much of the *Boko Haram* sect's demands are usually 'Islamic' in orientation both in terms of character and content. They believe for instance that modern government based on democracy and its principles is at variance with core 'Islamic principles' and as such it is prohibited to support and work under the government and its institutions (Joel, 2014). In concurrence, Tukur and Fausat (2015) have asserted that the fundamental ideology of *Boko Haram* is that Western Education is forbidden and therefore, should not be allowed to prevail among nations; particularly, Muslim dominated states.

2.6   Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that there are five or six factors that can be said to directly have contributed to the emergence of *Boko Haram* and ultimately, the on-going crisis in the North East. The factors discussed so far include the widespread perception of a failed political promise and hence the attendant retrogression of democratic expectations; the structural inequalities best exemplified in widespread poverty and deprivation amid a sea of conspicuous consumption, essentially gesturing to a socio-economic origin to the crisis, and more critically, the very central role the religious factor plays in fostering an extremely sensitive societal divide. The last factor is the ideological one itself closely linked to both politics and religion. It must however be stressed that all these factors will certainly recur and be revisited from other analytical perspectives; especially in terms of their proximate dimensions and impact on Human Development generally, in the continuing analysis and exploration of how they have impacted the North East Nigeria and ultimately affecting the country as a whole. In the chapter that follows, an attempt is made to expand the assessment and analysis by examining how these factors have in turn contributed to the making of a development and humanitarian crisis of international dimensions.

Chapter 3

The Making of a Complex and Multidimensional Humanitarian Crisis in the North East Region

3.1 Introduction

The resultant consequence of the conflict and violence followed by death and destruction in Nigeria's North East region has, undoubtedly seen to the emergence of an extremely complex and multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis. The objective in this chapter is to focus on the telling complexities and nuances that have a definitive and as a complex multidimensional nature. The idea is to use these as a basis for highlighting the more significant causal and consequential aspects of the crisis rather than to provide a full chronology of events that have taken place in their totality in the North East. The aim therein, is to demonstrate how at various points in time and at various geographic locations, the crisis impacted on the lives of people. In this regard, the analyses have been closely cross-referenced with the basic socio-economic indices that are in line with the socio-economic wellbeing and human development; notably indicators of life expectancy; health and education; human productivity in terms of agriculture or business; the environment, physical security as well as water sanitation and hygiene (the WASH factors). In so doing, the Report hopes to provide a lens through which appropriate responses and redress can, and should be conceptualised and analysed within the 'nexus' not just in Nigeria but in similarly-situated locales, settings and contexts.

3.2 Violence, Loss of Lives and Destruction of Property

According to the Nigerian Security Tracker, there were 1044 incidences of terror attacks by *Boko Haram* in the North-East region between 2009-2016, with diverse methods of attack in use. These included armed attacks; bombing and explosions, midnight/terror attacks; mass murder/suicide raid, assassination/murder and abductions. Although, the actual numbers of fatalities are often hard to come by, the table 3.1 and figure 3.1 here below presents the estimated number of fatalities based on the report of the Nigerian Security Tracker (2016), as further corroborated by a field survey conducted in 2017. And as already indicated in the preceding chapter, the respondents survey revealed that an estimated 46.3 percent of the population in the region reported life expectancy of between 31 and 40, significantly lower than the national average; 41 percent reported life expectancy of between 40-59 while only for 12.2 percent reported life expectancy of 60 years and above. Additionally, 46.7 percent of the respondents reported the loss of between 1 and 4 family members; about 23.61 percent reported loss of between 5 and 9 family members; 6.7 percent reported loss of between 10 and 15 family members and 3 percent had lost 16 or more family members. Instructively, all the referenced losses were attributed to conflicts and violence in the area, further confirming that the majority of the people have been negatively affected by conflict and violence in the region.

Table 3.1: Direct Human Casualties from the Boko Haram Insurgency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States

Year	Human Casualties	Remarks
2009	2,320.00	Mostly women and children lost their lives, including cases of rape and Gender Based Violence
2010	3,000.00	"
2011	3,560.00	"
2012	3,700.00	"
2013	4,420.00	"
2014	5,000.00	"
2015	5,220.00	"
2016	5,350.00	"
2009-2016	Over 600	School Teachers lost their lives

—Source: Field work, 2017

The table 3.2 herebelow adapted from a *Human Rights Watch Report* further disaggregates the wave of human destruction and displacement in terms of states, actual locations as well as comments that highlight the extent of devastation; whether resulting in deaths, casualties; human dislocation or the destruction of property.

Table 3.2: A Chronology of Reported Boko Haram Insurgency attacks in North Eastern States, 2009 to August, 2017

S/No	Date	States	Location	No of Deaths/ Disappearances	Injuries and Destruction
1.	26th-29th July 2009	Borno, Yobe, Bauchi	Maiduguri, Bauchi, Potiskum, Wudil	1000+	14
2.	7th sept 2010	Bauchi	Bauchi prison	5	721 inmates freed from prison
3.	4th Nov 2011	Yobe	Damaturu	150+	18; churches, Banks and police stations destroyed
4.	5th-6th Jan 2012	Adamawa, Borno, Gombe	Mubi, Yola, Maiduguri & Gombe	37 +	21; churches and business centers destroyed
5.	25th Dec. 2012	Borno, Yobe	Maiduguri, Potiskum	27+	several churches were destroyed
6.	19th-20th April 2013	Borno	Baga town	228+	29
7.	6th July 2013	Yobe	Mamudo Government secondary school	41 students; 1 teacher	
8.	29th Sept 2013	Yobe	Gujba college massacre	44+students and teachers	
9.	10th Oct. 2013	Borno	Damboa	20+	15
10.	19th Sept. 2013	Borno	Benisheik	161+	12
11.	29th Oct. 2013	Yobe	Damaturu	128	
12.	11th Jan 2014	Borno	Kawuri massacre	85+	
13.	11th Feb 2014	Borno	Konduga	39+	1000+ houses destroyed
14.	25th Feb 2014	Yobe	Federal Government college Buni yadi	59+	
15.	14th March, 2014	Borno	Giwa Barrack		Comrades freed from detention
16.	14th April 2014	Borno	Government Girls Secondary School Chibok	276+ Girls abducted	
17.	5th May 2014	Borno	Gamboru Ngala	300+	38
18.	1st June, 2014	Adamawa	Mubi	40	
19.	2nd June 2014	Borno	Gwoza	300+	
20.	20th-23rd June, 2014	Borno	North & Central Senatorial Districts	-------	200+ women and children were kidnaped
21.	3rd-7th Jan 2015	Borno	Baga	100	2000+ unaccounted for
22.	30th Jan 2016	Borno	Dalori village	86	62
23.	16th Jan 2017	Borno	University of Maiduguri	1 Professor; several others killed	
24.	1st August 2017	Borno	Chad Basin oil exploration	69+	3 university staff held captive
25.	2nd August 2017	Adamawa	Midlu Village of Vapura	7 +	
26.	From 2009- August, 2017	Borno	University of Maiduguri	5 lecturers killed	About 70 lecturers left for other Universities; and 3 held captive, students population dropped

—Source: Field work, 2017

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

3.2.1 Maiduguri as a Case Study

A study carried out by Mbaya (2013), revealed some of the serious implications of the *Boko Haram* insurgency in Maiduguri, Borno state. Maiduguri as already observed, has been the epicentre of the *Boko Haram* violence and conflict and the perceived effects on the community are summarised in table 3.3 here below.

Table 3.3: The implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Maiduguri

Implications	(%) of Respondents
• Creates more widows and orphans in the community • Cases of rape, sicknesses & diseases like hypertension • Breakdown of marriages, separation of families	25.5
• Creates fear among community members • Creates lack of trust among community members • Brought about psychological instability	3.2
• Mass exodus of people out of Maiduguri metropolis • Loss of lives & bread winners of families • Abandoned children, the sick and the aged	37.5
• Brought about religious intolerance • Burning &destruction of places of worship • Dividing community members along religious lines	13
• Increase social vices in the community • Criminality on the increase	20.8
Total	100

—Source: Adapted from Mbaya, 2013

As is clearly evident from table 3.3, a majority of the respondents (37.5 percent) were of the view that the social implications of *Boko Haram* insurgency in Maiduguri caused a mass exodus of people

out of Maiduguri city out of the need to look for safer places because of the fear of death. Moreover, many, especially bread winners lost their lives resulting in the abandonment of children, sicknesses and death of the aged. Some 25.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that the insurgency caused several women to become widows and children to become orphans without any hope of going to school. Similarly, many women were raped; many families separated; and fear created among community members coupled with lack of trust and psychological instability. The study further revealed other implications beyond the human casualties such as the increase in the number of IDPs; houses and commercial areas that were destroyed and resulting in psychological trauma for many, the rise in hypertension cases and other health problems.

Th table 3.4 shows that 21.6 percent of the respondents were of the view that the bread winners of many families lost their lives and that houses and property worth millions of Naira were destroyed with many people becoming refugees and displaced especially in London Chiki and Kellari wards of Maiduguri city. Similarly, 19.4 percent and 18.4 percent of the respondents at Budum Market and Dalla wards, respectively, reported that shops, business centres, property of various types including cars worth millions of Naira were destroyed.

Table 3.4: The Human and Economic implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Maiduguri

Areas of Bomb explosion	Implications	% of respondents
Dalla	• Lives lost, houses and property worth millions of naira were destroyed • Cars & business areas burnt down	18.4
Budum Market	• Shops burnt and destroyed • Property worth millions of Naira burnt • Many lives lost; cars burnt and houses destroyed	19.4
Wulari	• Commercial places and property worth millions destroyed • Many lives lost, many people lost jobs as a result of destruction of business areas	11.1
London Ciki/ Kellari	• Many lives lost, resulting in a mass exodus of people from the area • Many people rendered IDPs and refugees • Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed • Bread winners of many families lost their lives	21.6
State low cost	• People selling GSM accessories lost their shops • Lives lost leading to a mass exodus of people to other areas to be refugees; • Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed	8.2
Custom House	• Custom House affected, windows and glasses destroyed • Lives were lost, Cars got burnt • Houses & property worth millions of naira were destroyed	7.4
Bulunkutu Round about	• Late Governor's House affected • Lives lost • Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed	6.7
Airport Area	• Lives lost, Cars burnt • Houses and property worth millions of Naira destroyed	3.5
Baga Road	• People selling GSM accessories lost their shops • Lives lost and property destroyed	3.7
Total		100

—Source: Adapted from Mbaya, 2011

The Mbaya study further revealed the implications on institutions like schools, offices and banks as shown in table 3.5 which further makes clear that the security challenge posed by *Boko Haram* resulted in the closure of many educational and commercial institutions; a view supported by 43.5 percent of the respondents. Similarly, commercial activities were paralyzed, banks closed down, shops and markets closed down for weeks, as well as local, regional, national and international commercial offices relocated to other parts of the country which caused many people to lose their jobs as was asserted by 34.1 percent and 22.4 percent of the respondents, respectively.

Table 3.5: Implications of the insurgency on Educational and Commercial Institutions

Implications	%ofrespondents
• UniversityofMaiduguriandFederalGovernmentCollegecloseddownindefinitelybecauseofthe security challenge posed by Boko Haram • Private and Public secondary schools closed down in the metropolis • Educational institutions generally came to a stand still • Many University of Maiduguri students transferred to other universities	43.5
• Commercial activities paralyzed • Banks closed down for one week • Shops and markets closed down for weeks	34.1
• Local,regional,nationalandinternationalcommercialofficesrelocated/shiftedtootherpartsofthe country • Loss of jobs as many commercial offices relocate to other parts of the country	22.4
Total	100

—Source: Adapted from Mbaya, 2011

Most of the above findings were corroborated by Mohammed (2011) who advanced the view that the impact of the insurgency on July 26, 2009 in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa resulted in the loss of over 1000 lives and billions of Naira worth of property destroyed. In the same vein, Hamza and Kabiru (2011) reported that over 100 persons were killed on Friday 4th November 2011 in Damaturu, the Yobe State Capital as a result of suicide bombings and gunshots launched by suspected members of the Yusifiyya movement, also called *Boko Haram*, on many security and federal government formations. The violent activities of the insurgents are not limited to the North East and instructively, Augustine (2012) reported the death of over 200 persons on Friday 21st January 2012 in Kano as a result of multiple bomb blasts.

In terms of observed incidences and prevalence of conflict, the North-East geo-political zone has therefore been the worst hit and is most prone and most vulnerable with the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa as the critical flashpoints of the *Boko Haram* insurgency. Elsewhere, in parts of Bauchi and Gombe, the activities of the terrorists have also been pronounced and associated with a few isolated instances of attacks. Suffice it to state therefore, that practically all the states in the North East have witnessed *Boko Haram* attacks. But Borno State is clearly the most-affected and hence it has the largest number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) that stand at about one million five hundred according to Sidi (2015).

3.3 A Spectre of Internal Displacement Within Host Communities

The United Nations *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* states that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are:

"Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border." (UN 1998:1)

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for its part describes IDPs as "probably the largest group of vulnerable people in the world" (UN, (1998:1). The National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCREMIDS) recorded an increasing number of IDPs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa which in 2014 stood at 102,560 in Adamawa State; 257,694 in Borno State, and 76,354 in Yobe State. In 2015, Borno state alone had about one million five hundred IDPs according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

Fig. 3.2 | Internally Displaced Persons in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States

2016 — 1,687,703
2015 — Over 1.5 million
2014 — 436,608
2013 — 290,000
2012 — 200,000
2011 — 150,000
2010 — 130,000
2009 — 100,000

In sum, the various types of attacks led to displacements of thousands of people in the region, with Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states recording the highest number of IDPs. The rise in the number of IDPs in registered camps of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states as presented in figure 3.2 above, confirms the strong relationship between the *Boko Haram* violence and the unfolding humanitarian crises. In 2016 an estimated 1,687,703 were displaced in various camps in the three states alone, with the larger percentage being women and children. The immediate consequence of the influx of IDPs has been the concurrent increase in food insecurity, poor health services, inadequate water supply and poor sanitation in the registered camps. An assessment conducted by the NEMA in March 2015 reported that in Borno state 70 percent of IDP's living with host families reported that water and sanitation facilities were overstretched as a result of the influx of populations from high risk LGAs to low risk LGAs. In Yobe State, only 60 percent of the IDP's living with host families reported that access to water and sanitation in the LGAs covered was adequate while in Adamawa state, 65 percent of IDPs living with host families reported that the availability of water supply had decreased from an estimated pre-crisis availability of 75 litres per person per day to an average of 20 litres per person per day and that access to water treatment chemicals had also become increasingly difficult and that water utilities establishments in most parts of the affected LGAs had become moribund (Sidi, 2015). In all, the poor living conditions in IDP camps, as well as in the host communities, are a source of great concern. Reports from both domestic and international agencies have shown that IDPs have as far back as 2009 lacked adequate facilities and endured poor sanitation with remarkable increases in diseases such as malaria, acute watery diarrhoea, measles and pregnancy related diseases.

Given the magnitude of the crisis, the federal government and indeed, the Borno state government faced capacity challenges to offer protection to all the displaced persons. It proved difficult to ensure that IDPs do not suffer rape and thefts and that women and girls do not resort to vices such as prostitution as an alternative means for self-support. Moreover, it proved difficult to ensure that food or non-food items are not stolen from IDPs or that armed groups do not live or circulate within the camps. The situation was further compounded by the insufficient number of health and education facilities as well as the personnel to cater for these two critical basic needs. And whereas there were NGOs and other non-state actors present in Maiduguri it was reported that they appeared to be in competition with each other rather than working collaboratively, often leading to the duplication of efforts instead of meeting the actual needs of the IDPs.

3.4 Impacts on Practically all Aspects of Livelihood

The other aspect of the complex and multi-dimensional humanitarian and developmental crisis in the North East region has been, evidently, in the impacts felt by IDPs in practically every aspect of livelihood in the region. There have been impacts evidenced in the severe food shortages, and hence, the increase in cases of malnutrition and the obvious compounded effects on overall health. Similarly, the economic and purchasing power for most people, has been severely eroded due to the loss of employment that mainly arose from disruptions on government operations. Petty trade, day labour in construction, driving and government employment were also common sources of livelihood engagement especially during the dry season. IDP farming households often said they had access to land on a short-term basis but lacked the means to buy seeds, tools and other farm inputs. None of the main livelihood activities was possible in Bama LGA in 2016 (OCHA, 2016).

Host populations, IDPs, and recent returnees appear to have all lost their assets and income sources which were mainly agriculture, livestock, or local trading activities. Traders from Mubi

and Yola which are the main towns in Adamawa state reported difficulties in resuming normal business activities, including challenges with authorities, especially during customs clearance and payments at road checkpoints. In December 2015, 62 percent of IDPs and host households borrowed money to purchase food, cover health expenses, and meet other basic needs, including the purchase of agricultural tools and inputs. By April 2016, 40 percent of households reported a drop in income and only 23 percent an increase compared to December 2015, thereby suggesting that a significant proportion of the population was being pushed further into debt (IRC, 2016).

3.4.1 The Emergence of Food Insecurity

The *Boko Haram* insurgency has disrupted livelihood activities and reduced trade flows. Staples and other basic commodities have become scarce and prices have risen, preventing IDPs from accessing basic foodstuffs. An inter-agency humanitarian needs assessment carried out in mid-2014 found that it was common practice for IDP households to ration food portions as a means of getting by (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, May-June 2014). At that point in time, almost five million people in the region (8.5 million across the wider Lake Chad basin) were facing severe food insecurity. The food insecurity situation was being exacerbated by inability of many aid agencies to access those in need due to security challenges.

In essence, food production in the region plummeted as a result of able-bodied young men either fleeing the region or having been killed by the insurgents. It has been reported that in Borno state, cereal production plummeted between 2010 and 2015; sorghum by 82 per cent, rice by 67 per cent and millet by 55 per cent. Livestock production was equally affected as of February 2016 with 1,637 killed and over 200,000 cattle, sheep and goats, as well as 395,609 sacks of food items lost due to insurgents' attacks. As from December 2014, the fishing industry suffered a more or less similar fate as *Boko Haram* stepped up attacks on communities around Lake Chad.

The Region faced **REDUCTION** in the production of **FOOD**

Resulting from FLEEING or DEATH of ABLE-BODIED YOUNG MEN

Borno state
2010-2015

Cereal Production dropped

BY

82% SORGHUM — 67% RICE — 55% MILLET

The situation described above prompted the UN Secretary-General António Guterres to issue a warning in mid-2017 that "more than 20 million people in South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and North-East Nigeria were going hungry, and facing devastating levels of food insecurity". More

specifically, it was reported that 5.2 million Nigerians in the North East urgently needed food assistance, including 1.4 million facing an "emergency" and 38,000 famine-like conditions. In Borno state, 1,099,000 people, or 19 per cent of the population, faced "emergency" food insecurity (large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality) while 38,000 faced "famine" (extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies; starvation, death, and destitution evident). In Adamawa state, 197,000 people faced "emergency" and 5,800 in "catastrophic" phase; in Yobe state, 88,000 were in "emergency". In total, by mid-2017, in the north-eastern Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, an estimated 5.2 million people were facing severe food insecurity, with 450,000 children under the age of five suffering severe acute malnutrition.

The food scarcity, initially the consequence of the plummeting production and massive displacement, was compounded by the destruction of economic infrastructure as well as the restriction imposed on several key economic activities in large sections of Borno state. The fighting destroyed 30 per cent of houses, water sources, roads and bridges in the area, crippling agriculture and other economic activities. Road closures and curfews further restricted trade and free movement of persons. The trade in fish from Lake Chad was banned and the movement of foodstuffs or sale of vehicle fuel and fertilizers, as well as transportation by motorcycle were justified as short-term measures to help choke the insurgents. While these restrictions would appear justified, the prolonged enforcement of the bans and restrictions however, not only disrupted gainful economic activities but further aggravated the earlier miseries caused by the direct attacks and the human displacement.

3.4.2 A Malnutrition Crisis

Nigeria, especially the Northern region has historically registered some of the highest incidences of chronic malnutrition in the world, often at emergency levels. In Borno state, available data on nutrition have often masked severe conditions in isolated geographic areas. As of June 2016, some 750,000 people, excluding pregnant and breastfeeding women, were in immediate need of nutrition assistance in newly accessible areas. At that time, the Ministry of Health had estimated that, without intervention, 19 percent of children with Severe and Acute Malnutrition (SAM) would die; which would translate to 128 SAM children dying every day (MOH, 2016). A rapid assessment in June 2016 in Bama LGA found that 19 percent of the 24,000 people found in a camp on a hospital compound, including 15,000 children (among them 4,500 under five) were severely malnourished and that from 23rd May, at least 188 people had died in the camp; that is almost six people per day – mainly from diarrhoea and malnutrition. In Adamawa state screening within IDP camps found a high proportion of children with SAM, with malnutrition as a chronic problem in the areas of Madagali, Michika, Uba and Mubi. In Yobe state the overall nutrition information seemed to mask, again, significant pockets of under nutrition. An assessment in Jakusko LGA, following a measles outbreak, showed an 8.9 percent SAM in children under five. The scenario was the same for Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba where screening within IDP camps found a high proportion of children with SAM in the Akko LGA.

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3.4.3 Insecurity, Bureaucratic Bottlenecks and Logistical Challenges

Food aid delivery was greatly hampered by the prevalent state of insecurity and despite the government's efforts to address the security challenges, aid workers reported that roughly 80 per cent of Borno state, along with parts of Adamawa and Yobe states, still presented high or very high risks for humanitarian agencies' operations. For instance, on 28 July, 2016 aid deliveries (food and non-food items) had to be briefly suspended after insurgents attacked an aid convoy between Maiduguri and the town of Bama. In some areas the effective hold was confined to local government headquarters with the general security situation remaining too risky for aid workers in several localities; as a result of which food aid delivery was weakest where probably the food situation was most dire – in the remote, hard-to-reach areas.

The situation gets further complicated by the fact that the majority of the IDPs in Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba were living with host communities and therefore making it difficult for both the government and aid agencies to track and locate them; let alone prioritize their needs. Over and above the challenge posed by insecurity, reports have pointed to the entrenched bureaucracy and corruption that also impedes aid delivery. Together, all these factors mean that food aid would not be reaching large numbers who are in need, including some of the most vulnerable. Thus, whereas efforts were made to send food aid to IDPs, supply was not consistent. The net result of delayed and inadequate funding, pervasive insecurity, poor and unreliable distribution, corruption, as well as bureaucratic red tape is that as of April 2017, only 1.9 million of the 5.2 million (a mere 37 per cent) of the population at risk of severe food insecurity was being reached.

3.5 Crisis in the Health Sector

Provision of adequate health services is a key component of humanitarian response and community stabilisation efforts. Whereas the inadequate access to health facilities has been reported for more than 54.72 percent of the respondents surveyed in 2017 as well as the lack of access to regular medical check-up by 51.39 percent of the population, the IDPs are clearly the worst hit. The IDPs, like refugees, should enjoy access to health services that approximate those of the host population at a minimum. However, reports from as far back as 2014 indicate that IDPs in Borno state often had only minimal access to health services, and that this primarily affected women and children. Most health facilities, some of which were deliberately targeted by *Boko Haram* were closed as of mid-2014 while others were damaged or destroyed. As of March 2014, only 37 per cent of the health facilities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states were functional. Moreover, health facilities in the region were generally already poorly resourced even before the crisis and additional resources have not been provided to meet the needs of the displaced populations. In fact, in some communities there are no facilities or even staff to meet even the most basic health needs of IDPs and their hosts. The primary health care services, in particular, have been overwhelmed by the influx of IDPs. In Biu IDP camp, in Borno state, for instance, it was reported that an outbreak of cholera involving some 375 cases resulted in 27 deaths with poor hygiene conditions facilitating the outbreak and causing secondary displacement. The report showed that 40 percent of the outbreaks of cholera in Maiduguri were reported to be from IDP camps and that this percentage decreased significantly upon medical intervention.

The primary obstacle in accessing health care for many IDPs is the prohibitive cost of health services and the inability to access local health facilities in time. Although the state ordered hospitals to attend to IDPs free of charge upon receipt of a State Environment Management Agency (SEMA) letter authorizing their expenses, the SEMAs have failed to reimburse the hospitals, leading them to subsequently refuse to accept the letters *in lieu* of payment. This decision has effectively left IDPs out of medical treatment, given that they have to pay an initial registration fee of 500 Naira plus their consultation and medication costs. In communities without health programmes run by international NGOs, many IDPs therefore have no access to health care of any kind. Outbreaks of disease and malnutrition rates have increased in areas affected by displacement due to the absence of, or poor health services. The number of cholera cases among IDPs and host communities rose exponentially, with 26,204 cases and 404 deaths reported between January and July 2014, compared with 167 cases during the same period in 2013. In an attempt to deal with the effect of the outbreak, SEMA sank boreholes in all the IDPs camps in Maiduguri, while the NGOs through the implementation of the WASH programme ensured that most of the camps were cholera free. Existing health services and access are limited in host communities, especially in newly accessible areas (UN Joint Multi-Sector Assessment 14/04/2016). Moreover, Health staff are reluctant to work in the more remote LGAs, and local clinics are reportedly being staffed on a rotational basis. The result is that expectant women do not have access to antenatal care while others give birth while fleeing and without access to postnatal healthcare (PUI, 2016). A 2016 Assessment of the North-eastern states highlighted Borno as the most affected in terms of impact on health infrastructure with only 12 out of 29 hospitals functional while damaged equipment was recorded in 75 percent of the primary healthcare facilities (PCNI, 2016). Some 14 percent of the hospitals and 35 percent of PHCs have been destroyed and a further 7 percent of hospitals and 10 percent of PHCs damaged (MOH, 2016).

In Adamawa, the lack of medicines and the cost of treatment are the key factors that prevent IDPs from accessing health services. Only IDPs in official camps receive free treatment. In the

meantime, three main health centres: Madagali, Michika and Hong were destroyed thereby significantly reducing access to health service coverage. In Yobe it was reported that 46 percent of the states' primary health centres and 23 percent of hospitals have been damaged or destroyed and health coverage is extremely low partly because most of the qualified health workers fled the area. A measles outbreak affecting some 840 was reported in Yobe state in the month of April 2016 with most of them in Damaturu and Jakusko LGAs and most cases affecting children under one-year-old. In Gombe state all the health facilities and centres were reported as functional and operating optimally but the cost of transportation to hospitals and the healthcare fees severely restricts IDPs access. In Bauchi all of the 15 hospitals assessed in September 2015 were found to be functional except for the shortage of doctors: one doctor per 35,000 people. Moreover, the health facilities lack basic amenities such as water and electricity, with as many as 87 percent of the primary health facilities in Taraba lacking electricity supply, compared to 65 percent of facilities in the North-Eastern region. In Adamawa, about 32 percent of the state's primary health centres have been damaged or destroyed and are physically inaccessible to the majority of the population. Although 87 percent of respondents in the eight of the most affected LGAs reported being able to reach medical facilities within 30 minutes, 83 percent of the health centres reported holding insufficient drug stocks. The hospitals in urban Yola and Mubi are better stocked than facilities in rural areas, where stocks are lower and are replenished less frequently and IDPs have limited access due to costs.

These findings by governmental and non-governmental agencies and other humanitarian actors are corroborated by the results of the survey commissioned as part of the process of producing this report referred to earlier. The figure 3.3 shows that an average of 42.78 percent of the respondents in the North East reported having access to adequate health care facilities while 54.72 reported not having adequate access, thus indicating that the majority do not have access to health care facilities except for Yobe state with about 73 percent of the respondents indicating access to adequate health care facilities. The same scenario plays out with respect to satisfaction with the level of health facilities as shown in figure 3.4 which shows that an average of 32.2 percent of the respondents in the six states are satisfied with the level of health facilities while 65 percent are not, implying that the majority are not satisfied with the level of health care facilities except, again, in Yobe state where about 60 percent of respondents are satisfied with the level of facilities.

Fig. 3.3 | Easy accessibility of health care services by communities in the North Eastern States (%)

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

3.6   The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Crisis

3.6.1   Water

In 2002 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)), an organ and the supervisory body for International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted a General Comment stressing that the human right to drinking water is fundamental for life and health. The Comment urged state parties to ensure that refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons and returnees have access to adequate drinking water irrespective of where they are. Access to water however, remains problematic in the region in terms of availability, access and quality, although these issues vary widely across geographic space. The provision of sufficient water points and sanitation facilities is a priority need in locations where an influx of IDPs has led to overcrowding (ACAPS, 2016). Payment for water from water vendors, and access to public water sources and suitable water containers are all important challenges. In some areas, the main water sources are water vendors and unprotected sources. In Flour Mills area of Maiduguri where informal settlements are mixed within host communities, for instance, 16 percent of the population were highly dependent on water vendors.

In Adamawa state access to water is an issue for IDPs, particularly those residing in informal settlements or with host communities where water points are broken. There are also significant issues around vector control and drainage systems, in camps, host communities, and informal settlements (IRC, 2016). Open defecation in IDP camps is also a concern: an outbreak of diarrhoea in one of the camps in Yola was attributed to contaminated water (OCHA, 2016). Hygiene practices are relatively good although, with Lassa fever, Ebola, cholera, and severe diarrhoea including dysentery ever-present, hygiene awareness and knowledge remains a need (IRC, 2016).

In Yobe state the main water sources for IDPs and host communities are boreholes with motorised or solar-powered pumps, and water trucking. Over 60 percent of IDPs in host communities reported having insufficient containers for water collection and storage. IDPs living within host communities in Yobe have been reported to have equal access with the host population to local sources of drinking water. In most camps, there is access to sufficient water. However, in Kasaisa,

Kukareta, Bukari Ali camp, and Mohammadu camps it takes people between 30 and 90 minutes to fetch water. However, 9 percent of water and sanitation facilities require rehabilitation. The situation in Gombe state as far as water is concerned is that communities in Akko and Nafada LGAs are facing problems accessing water and sanitation. In areas with a dam or a borehole, access is usually limited for remote communities (Save the Children, 2016). Most of the people have to buy water from vendors and the IDPs in particular do not have the money to pay. In Bauchi and Taraba states, access to clean water is a problem. Majority of the people in Taraba state rely on wells for their water.

The commissioned perception study revealed that an average of 30.83 percent of the respondents agreed that there is regular pipe-borne water supply in their community while 64.45 percent disagreed thus showing that the majority did not have access to regular pipe-borne water other than for Yobe state where about 83.33 percent of the respondents agreed they had regular pipe-borne water supply.

> An average of 30.83 percent of the respondents agreed that there is regular pipe-borne water supply in their community while 64.45 percent disagreed thus showing that the majority did not have access to regular pipe-born water.

Fig. 3.5 Supply of Pipe-borne water to communities in the North Eastern States (%)

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

3.6.2 Sanitation and Hygiene

IDPs and host communities in the North-East have only limited access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation, leading to a decline in health and hygiene among both IDPs and their host communities. Public latrines in informal camp-like settings such as schools are often non-existent or unusable (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). Open defecation and the disposal of children's waste in the open are common, particularly in urban or densely populated camps (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). Open defecation raises health, security and dignity issues, particularly for women and girls, and creates tension. In 2014, the contamination of water sources was cited as a major contributor to cholera outbreaks in a number of displacement sites in Biu and Maiduguri, Borno state (SRP, 2014). The overall environmental hygiene among

displaced households is poor as a result of overcrowded conditions and shortages of water and other materials and this becomes a matter of particular concern to women and teenage girls who face the challenge of maintaining menstrual hygiene in very constrained circumstances. An illustrative case was witnessed in Adamawa NYSC IDP camp in 2014. In that instance, there were hardly any bathing sites for women. The situation was also characterized by indiscriminate waste disposal, poor management of waste and the practice of open defecation was rampant. In Borno state, Municipal solid waste management is limited to main streets and official IDP camps with open dumping and burning widespread across Maiduguri; including into natural water bodies and drains. Hazardous healthcare waste (in particular, sharp objects and pharmaceutical wastes) are disposed in dumpsites without treatment. Moreover, the informal IDP camps are not integrated into the municipal waste collection and therefore, households and other establishments have to manage their own waste pits. In Maiduguri, most households burn waste when possible; otherwise, they dispose of the waste in an open field. In general, there has been no regular public waste collection service in all the states in North East Nigeria and household refuse is dumped indiscriminately. Some private contractors do however, provide waste collection services to those willing to pay, usually the commercial entities such as shops, and healthcare facilities. In official IDP camps, waste is regularly collected and brought to predefined locations within camp boundaries, but elsewhere waste management remains a big concern.

From the commissioned perception survey, the figure 3.6 below shows that an average of 48.06 percent of the respondents in the six North East states agreed that there is regular sanitation exercise in their community while 58.06 percent, i.e. the majority disagreed. Adamawa, Borno and Gombe appeared not to experience any regular sanitation exercises, but Bauchi, Taraba and Yobe states indicated 66.67 percent, 68.33 percent and 83.33 percent, respectively, of respondents reported having regular sanitation exercises.

Fig. 3.6 Environmental Sanitation in the communities in the North Eastern States (%)

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

3.7   The Educational Crisis

It is a generally accepted view that while governments and non-state actors often view protection, food, water, shelter and health care as basic necessities during displacement; education does not always have a similar level of support, particularly in the emergency phase of the cycle of

displacement. However, there are numerous reasons why formal education (e.g., school-based) and non-formal education (e.g., out-of-school) are important for IDPs, in particular children and young people. In addition to providing the essential building blocks for learning, education during displacement can protect against exploitation and harm; offer structure, stability and hope in a time of crisis; promote the acquisition of skills for life; and support conflict resolution and peace building (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergency, 2004). With many IDPs sheltering in schools and humanitarian assistance often limited to life-saving interventions, displaced children are generally unable to pursue their education. *Boko Haram* attacks against schools since 2012 and state governments' closure of educational facilities in the worst affected areas, such as Borno state, drastically decreased access. All schools in the towns of Baga, Bama, Jajeri, Umarari Garnam, Mai Malari, Mungono and Gamboru were forced to close between February 2012 and June 2013. *Boko Haram* destroyed 14 schools in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri between January and April 2013, and at least 256 were destroyed across the state (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). At the height of the insurgency, all state schools in Borno were closed in March 2014.

IDPs and members of the security forces occupying schools also damaged, and in some cases destroyed the education infrastructure. A surge in displacement in northern Adamawa state during the July to September 2014 holidays led to a large number of IDPs sheltering in schools, which prevented classes from resuming at the start of the next academic year. Even in areas where schools remained open, many children, including IDPs, do not attend for fear of attack and abduction. The abduction of students in IDPs' home areas has made parents wary of sending their children to school, even in the comparative safety of the areas of refuge in neighbouring states. Parents also tend to prioritize basic needs such as shelter and food over education (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). Consequently, attendance rates declined dramatically in the region.

3.7.1 Educational Crisis in Maiduguri, Borno is Apical

Whereas displaced children's access to education varies from state to state, the situation in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital at the height of the crisis was particularly pathetic and, perhaps, most aptly captures and illustrates the impact of the educational crisis on IDPs in the entire North East. The IDPs were often refused attendance at host community schools that did not have the facilities or staff to take on any more students. Thus, during the first half of 2014, admission was denied to many IDP children in Maiduguri, Borno state because the school year had already started (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, May-June 2014). Education in Borno was also severely affected partly because schools were some of the first targets of the *Boko Haram* insurgency. Many buildings were destroyed and rendered out of use for a long time. Even prior to the crisis, many children, especially in northern Borno, were not

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attending school thus creating the need for a catch-up programme to enable older children with no schooling background to enter school at an age-appropriate level (Borno Education Sector, 01/07/2016). Moreover, all the 1,721 state schools in Borno closed in 2013 and only the 212 private schools continued to operate. Between 2009 and October 2015, *Boko Haram* murdered more than 600 teachers, half of whom were from Borno state, while others were threatened, injured or kidnapped. The result has been that around 19,000 teachers fled their posts (IRIN, 2015). As of July 2016, four schools were occupied by IDPs and a total of 547 schools were damaged or destroyed. Even though many schools were reopened in Maiduguri after the satisfaction by the military that the capital was safe for academic purposes and in fact being guarded by armed soldiers, many parents are still not willing to send their children back to school.

19,000 teachers fled **&** **547 schools were damaged or destroyed**

3.7.2 Severe and Diverse Impacts on Education Across the North East

In Gombe state, schools have reportedly been largely unaffected by the influxes of IDPs, but some displaced children were still refused admission. In Taraba state, schools were attacked and more than 100 forced to close in 2014. Others were open to IDPs, but were suffering severe shortages of materials. Displaced children in Bauchi state were able to enrol in host community schools, but overstretched resources lowered the quality of education for all. Classrooms were overcrowded, under-resourced and under-staffed (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, 2014). The IDPs' lack of financial resources and the distance their children need to travel to get to school are further obstacles to their education.

In an assessment in Yola and Mubi, both in Adamawa state by IRC (2016), nearly 90 percent of respondents said that there was a functional school near their home. This response was equal between IDPs in camps and IDPs in informal settlements, host communities, as well as returnees. For those who said that there was not a functional school close by, the reasons cited were that school buildings had been destroyed by *Boko Haram;* lack of equipment or materials; lack of teachers in the area; teachers not working due to lack of payment, and parents unable to buy materials or pay fees. The poor security situation, especially in Madagali and Michika LGAs, and the fear of attacks also prevented children from attending school.

In Yobe, Bauchi and Taraba states, IDPs seem to generally have access to schools within host communities. However, similar problems to those experienced in other states, such as chronic underfunding, lack of teaching personnel, insufficient spaces for all the IDP children and lack of teaching materials persist. For instance, the majority of IDP children in Gombe may be currently out of school due to the inability to pay school fees or buy uniforms and books. And although the government officially allows IDPs to go to school without paying fees, the schools themselves often refuse access to IDP children or students mainly due to lack of funds (Save the

Children, 2016).

3.7.3 Education in Favour of Male Children

The figure 3.7 here below derived from the commissioned perception survey shows that an average of 60.83 percent of the respondents in the six states have more male children enrolled in schools while 35 percent have more female children enrolled in schools. This result is an indication of the skewed practice that favours male children's education over female children.

Fig. 3.7 Number of children enrolled in school (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary institutions) by Sex (%)

—Source: Field Survey, 2017

3.7.4 Some Promising Initiatives for Education in the North East

It is apparent from the survey undertaken that the provision of education to IDPs requires collaboration between government and non-state actors. A good working example of such collaboration was manifest under the leadership of the Ministry of Education and Technical Secretariat led by the National Emergency Management Agency and within the design of the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) Technical Committee's Action Plan. The SSI is a response to the attacks on schools to improve linkages between the communities, the schools and their security. In Borno, a number of SSI activities have been undertaken in Maiduguri and Biu whereas in Adamawa the SSI activities were concentrated in Yola city as well as some few host communities of Mubi North and Mubi South LGAs. State Coordination Committees (SCCs) whose responsibility it is to manage SSI activities within each state/location have been established. The SCCs comprise membership from all stakeholders within the education sector in emergency areas and other structures at the state level. These SCCs have overseen the profiling of IDP learners, mapping of schools as well as the allocation of IDP learners to schools. In addition, the SCCs have been playing a critical role in quality assurance of the double shift schooling (UNICEF, 2015).

3.8 The Crisis of Shelter and Accommodation

The principles of the management of IDPs dictate that some form of decent accommodation is

necessary in ensuring quality standard of living. The lack of decent accommodation however, has been one of the most critical challenges facing displaced persons. IDPs are sometimes able to find shelter with family or friends in urban areas but many others are forced to live in dire conditions including in abandoned buildings. The greatest needs are among IDPs living in host communities who are estimated at 92 percent and living in rented accommodation often under extremely poor conditions. Various reports from multiple agencies confirm that these IDPs live in makeshift shelters made of sticks, grass and damaged zinc, while those in the recently accessed areas were in more urgent need as they were spending their nights in the open. Others pay rent to the landowner who continues living in one building or in one room of a building in the compound and who remains in close physical proximity to the IDPs.

92%

Estimated percent of IDPs living with host communities and having the greatest needs for shelter and accommodation.

3.8.1 The Sad Tale of 'Secondary' Displacement

In other instances, other IDPs rent an entire unit from an absent landlord and then rent part of it to other IDPs. The inability to pay rent is a major factor in this form of 'secondary displacement' as landlords only allow IDPs to stay a few months without paying rent after which they get consigned to abandoned buildings. According to a report by the International Office of Migration (IOM), of the over 1.6 million IDPs identified in Borno, fewer than 10 percent resided in some 49 formal or informal camps as of 30th June 2016. Most camps were however informal, which means that structured support was limited and several sites have been set up in unsafe locations. As of this date, some 48,000 IDPs were residing in sub-standard shelter in locations where the most common shelter type were tents, including self-made tents and almost 15,000 were residing in or around schools. Various assessments and anecdotal information about informal settlements found that the shelter conditions were not only makeshift and completely inadequate in terms of protection but that they also exposed adolescent girls, unaccompanied children and female-headed households to health and hygiene risks including the lack of privacy, potentially exacerbating protection concerns. An assessment within New Prison IDP settlement in Maiduguri found more than 3,000 IDPs living in makeshift shelters made of grass and plastic sheets, with water dripping through the roofs. These were obviously inadequate during the rainy season. In the meantime, a new informal camp was emerging in Rann in the outskirts of Maiduguri, with at least 10,000 IDPs. The story was repeated in Southern Borno where most of the shelters occupied by IDPs are overcrowded and unfinished, with inadequate weather-proofing yet rents are high and many households are indebted to landlords.

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Secondary Displacement

1.6 million IDPs in Borno

FACT

as of 30th June 2016, fewer than 10 percent of IDPs resided in the 49 formal or informal camps

This means that structured support is limited and several sites have been set up in unsafe locations.

some 48,000 of the IDPs were residing in sub-standard shelter in locations where the most common shelter type were tents; including self-made tents.

Some 15,000 were residing in or around schools.

Assessment Information
- ☒ Makeshift/Inadequate Shelters
- ☒ Lack of Protection
- ☒ Adolescent children, especially girls exposed to risks;
- ☒ Lack of Privacy

—Adapted from, International Office of Migration (IOM) report.

A February to March 2015 assessment by the Adamawa State Insurgency Victims Support Committee in seven LGAs (Gombi, Hong, Mahiha, Mubi North, and Mubi South) found that private houses were the most affected by the conflict and accounted for two-thirds of damaged and destroyed buildings. For Yobe there were only five IDP hosting camps with shelter becoming an emergency need. In Gombe a 2016 report showed that IDPs had been living in a camp that had

been closed by the authorities which then forced them to live within host communities but the majority could not afford the rent and were thus forced to shelter in abandoned buildings or to keep moving.

3.9   Conclusion: A Proper Multi-Dimensional Crisis

As has been evidently demonstrated in this chapter, the *Boko Haram* insurgency as fuelled by a number of causal factors; both immediate and historical, has had a monumental impact in practically all spheres of the productive human life in the North East region. Its worst impact is probably the death and destruction that it has left in its wake, coupled with the unending scenarios of human displacement, currently emblematic in the hundreds of thousands of IDPs. The closely related humanitarian crisis has been chronicled in terms of the multi-dimensional crises in health, education, food security and the totality of productive livelihoods. The crisis is also acutely evidenced in the water, sanitation and hygiene crises and quite graphically pronounced in the shelter and accommodation crisis that has gripped millions of IDPs. Quite clearly, the situation in the North East seems to have presented a classic case study of a major developmental and humanitarian crisis.

In the next chapter of this report, an effort will therefore be made to present some possible solutions and remedial measures that are informed by some innovative and current thinking on strategies, interventions and approaches that can holistically tackle the complex effects of a raging humanitarian crisis within a given nexus. A critical component of the remedy appears to lie within the UNs pronouncement of 'a New Way of Working' but it is clearly also hinged on a change and transformation theory accompanied with deliberate policy options that require the collective will of both government and the people of Nigeria working in concert with well-wishers in and out of Nigeria.

Chapter **4**

Journeying Towards a 'New Way of Working': A Framework Model for Achieving Rehabilitation, Re-Integration and Sustainable Development

4.1   In Search of Models that Deliver

This chapter sets as its objective, the need to look more deeply at models that can help deliver the totality of rehabilitation, re-integration as well as inclusive and sustainable development in the face of complex humanitarian emergencies and the resultant developmental challenges such as Nigeria's North East has experienced over the last decade or so. The premise is to [re] examine the complex interplay of factors most of which have already been identified in this and many other reports, but from the analytical paradigm and prism of "unpacking and operationalising the nexus." In 'unpacking and operationalising the nexus' the report sets the stage for innovations that are aimed at improving the understanding as well as ways of resolving the increasing preponderance of extremely complex development and humanitarian challenges that are in part, the result of the ascent of terrorism in diverse global locations. Ultimately, a newer, if not entirely novel framework model is proposed to aid the more comprehensive analysis and understanding of the Humanitarian – Development- Peace "nexus," with reliance on the experience of Nigeria's North East region.

4.1.1   The UNs 'New Way of Working'

The United Nation's *'New Way of Working'* provides a handy starting point for anchoring the perspective being canvassed here. As has been aptly stated, the vision is to, "work towards collective outcomes across the humanitarian and development community and wherever possible, those efforts should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that already exist at national and local levels; whilst ultimately working towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals" (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 5th October, 2017).[1] For his part, the UN Secretary General Antonio Gutierrez has also [re]-emphasized at the beginning of the year 2018 that, this "New Way", "… is about recognizing common goals and optimizing existing resources and capabilities to help all people in situations of risk, vulnerability and crisis. It is about working better together to reduce humanitarian needs over the medium to long-term" (Quoted on January, 28, 2018). Ultimately, it is hoped that the chapter becomes a direct added value beyond what presently exists in the literature and thus pushes the frontiers of knowledge, while also stimulating more robust policy dialogue as the national authorities, together with the international community, move towards concerted attention on Nigeria's North East. It is to be noted in this regard, that an increasingly vast amount of global developmental literature now deploys the notion of 'nexus' to underpin the complexities and nuances attendant to emergency situations; whether they be man-made or the consequence of natural disasters. Thus, "the nexus" is seen as the tool for reinforcing the links between the two sectors (humanitarian and development), increasing the complementarity of their actions in order to address the root causes of the crises and reduce needs (ALNAP, 2018).

4.2   Theoretical Underpinnings of the Proposed Response Framework

4.2.1   Conceptualising the Analytical Framework

An understanding of 'Structure' is an important starting point for any analytical and response framework. In the context of the *Boko Haram* insurgency and the attendant crisis, structure may usefully inform the response to its activities and impacts; especially given its tendency to mutate quickly with passage of time and with changes in the socio-political environment in

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1   See, https://www.icvanetwork.org/node/7609

which it operates. The analytical framework presented herein is accordingly made up of three inter-related broad components, in essence capturing:

(i) **The self-acclaimed causes,** motivations and justifications of the insurgency; including various forms of grievances and what, in some quarters, is viewed as historical injustices and marginalisation, or more aptly development deficit, experienced by the local communities;

(ii) **The definitions of the primary and secondary perpetrators** of the insurgency and their force multipliers, noted as being a reflection of the multi-dimensional characteristics that enables and fuels the multi-faceted broad impacts on the socio-political and economic life of affected communities; and

(iii) **The enabling factors and catalytic agents** that lend the insurgency its apparent physical and spiritual formidability. These enablers and catalytic agents emanate from within both Nigeria's internal and external environments and foster the insurgency by supplying it with resources such as devoted fighters, technical and logistical support as well as the religious and political-ideological articulation.

As will be evident in the later sections of this chapter, the analytical and response framework is conceptualised by interweaving these three broad components into a matrix framework that captures and presents the inter-play of the causes and manifestations of the insurgency; its perpetration side effects in various forms; and the mitigation measures that could be taken to ameliorate and ultimately, address the adverse impacts on affected communities so as to help recover and restore their socio-economic well-being and livelihood systems over the medium-to long-term. Importantly, all these are fused into an integrated wholesome matrix model that sheds light on possible policy frameworks and actionable measures that could be taken as part of an overall strategy for resilience building and reconstruction strategy to recover, restore and reconstruct the affected communities and their livelihoods, as well as promote inclusive economic growth, human development and environmental sustainability.

4.2.2 Understanding Why People Engage Violence

It is to be appreciated that the causes and motivational factors behind the *Boko Haram* insurgency are complex and have been canvassed appropriately in preceding sections of this report. Moreover, the tactics and extents of violent extremism are ruthless and devastating, including the brutal destruction of human life and property; indiscriminate displacements of whole communities; inhuman abductions and trafficking; and extreme religious radicalization, particularly of the youth for unbridled violence. These tactics make it important and necessary to present and consider some of the contemporary theories on why some people resort to violence against others and society in general, including, ultimately, maiming and killing them.

Contemporary literature on violent extremism appear to suggest many and varied reasons why people or groups visit violence against others. Here below, five main theoretical explanations for why people or organised groups indulge in violence against others and society in general, including killing, with particular, or at least some degree of, relevance to the *Boko Haram* are presented.

(i) **The rational-choice utilitarian theory,** predicts that people and organised groups will indulge in violent acts for material gains and other benefits, including capture and retention of political power. This theory presupposes that those who engage violence for utilitarian purposes are for one reason or another, unable to obtain the same through legitimate peaceful means; usually due to what may present as discriminative systemic blockage of opportunities. Generally, the greater the value

(ii) ***The psychopathic mental state of mind as an illness,*** postulates the perpetration of violence to a psychopathic mental state of mind as an illness hence; that those who indulge in violence against others are psychopathic sadists who derive pleasure from hurting or even killing others and they are therefore people who are ill and in need of treatment.

(iii) ***The dis-inhibition theory*** propositions that an ordinary normal person, or rather all human beings, have inherent violent impulses that are usually held in check and that when their moral senses break down or are somehow blocked, they give in to their dark sides and indulge in violence. The dis-inhibition theory however, avoids the question of why people are motivated to engage violence in the first place.

(iv) ***The Sacred Value Theory*** has in turn been developed by anthropologists Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran, (2007) based on their survey carried out around the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. They established that among the survey participants, there was a group to whom their ancestral land was so sacredly tied to their communal identity, that offering financial compensation as an incentive for them to agree to a deal for settlement not only reduced their support for the settlement deal but actually elevated levels of their anger and disgust, as well as increased their enthusiasm for violence.

Lastly,

(v) ***The moral justification theory,*** is propositioned by Tage Rai, MIT Sloan School of Management, (2014) and propositions that people and organized groups will indulge in violence when and if societal cultural values and norms permit it and more so, if the societal moral values demand that they engage violence, either to right deemed wrongs done to their own people, community or humanity in general or, in order to uphold and sustain self-honour and moral order in the community or society.

4.3 Fitting the Violence Motivation Theories into the Boko Haram Insurgency

From a theoretical perspective, the *Boko Haram* insurgency's motivations and justifications generally fit into some or all of the five theoretical bases cited above that attempt to explain the motivation to violence. In the *Boko Haram* context these therefore include in particular, resistance to Foreign Western Education; resistance to the imposition of cultural domination; the defence and promotion of 'sacred/purist' Islamic values, as well as the protest against what is perceived generally, as asymmetry in development and blocked opportunities.

4.3.1 Resistance to Foreign Western Education

European intervention and the subsequent colonization of Nigeria brought with it Western Education which emphasized professional and technical skills for application in the secular public and private spheres of life. Early awakening of the southern Nigerian ethnic nationalities to the value of Western Education by pioneer European Christian missionaries made it a high value asset and one in great demand. As bright students from among early converts to Christianity found their way to Western Universities in Britain and the USA, the demand for Western Education by the southern ethnic communities escalated. On the contrary, among the Muslim-dominated northern Nigerian ethnic nationalities, Western Education was viewed negatively; primarily because it was

perceived as a forerunner to brain wash school-going youth to convert into Christianity. Secondly, Western Education was tightly intertwined with Christian religious teachings that propagated doctrines and beliefs, some of which were deemed to be fundamentally opposed, if not altogether repugnant, to Islamic doctrines and commandments of *Allah.* Moroever, in most of the North, the predominant Muslim territory already had a functioning system of Islamic education in the two forms of the *Qur'anic* school, *(Makarantar Allo)* and the advanced knowledge school of *Makarantar Ilmi.* The system had flourished in northern Nigeria for centuries and Western Education was therefore considered as an unwelcome invasive attack on the well-established traditional dual education system. In a nutshell, resistance to Western Education therefore stands out as a core rallying point and clarion call of the *Boko Haram* movement.

4.3.2 Resistance Against Cultural Domination

Prior to British colonization, the North-Eastern territory had been under the sovereign rule of the Bornu Empire composed of majority Kanuri-Muslims, which subsequently became part of the expansive *Sokoto Caliphate.* The imposition of British rule thus instigated anti-foreign conquest sentiments, resulting in increased allegiance of local populations to the Bornu Sultanate, and by extension to the *Sokoto Caliphate.* In the process, this contributed to increased Islamic fundamentalism as a self-actualisation response to the profound disaffection with the activities of the Christian British colonial authority. In the complex socio-political situation that emerged, the spirit of resistance to "foreign" authority manifested at two levels; one, at the local regional level where various minority ethnic communities were forcefully converted to Islam, via *Jihad*, as well as being forcefully incorporated into the *Sokoto Caliphate*, and by so doing, subject to what was perceived, in some quarters, as the *Hausa-Fulani* dominance. At the second level, the spirit of resistance is religiously articulated, manifesting in the form of the *Sokoto Caliphate* and its expanded territory, uprising against imposition of British colonial rule in the first instance. Later, this resistance is manifest in the context of the successor to the Caliphate, i.e the Federal Government of Nigeria. These two-tier levels of disenchantment further explain aspects of the genesis of the empathy and popular support, in some quarters, for *Boko Haram.* While thus, some of the local people perceive *Boko Haram* as a liberation movement, others see it as a devoted army of champion Islamic warriors who are wedging a legitimate war against Western cultural, *cum* Christian religious dominance camouflaging as Western Education.

4.3.3 The Defence and Promotion of Sacred Islamic Values

The emergence of *Boko Haram* is further seen as an extension of the long history of militant Islamic resistance to the invasive external political influence alongside Christian religious doctrines. The North-Eastern Nigeria which is the epicentre of the insurgency is a region with predominantly Muslim populations with a history of religious extremism, dating as far back as the time when Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio waged the *jihadist* war against what he described as un-Islamic and corrupt ruling elites, in the early 19th century. The long history of religious extremism in turn, invariably, entrenched religiously-articulated intolerance and an endemic sense of Islamic sacred values worthy of fighting for unto martyrdom among the local populations. Importantly, the victorious jihadist wars led to the establishment of the sharia law that were administered under the *Sokoto Caliphate,* whereupon there was forceful spread of Islam amongst the proliferate minority ethnic communities, apart from their being forcefully incorporated into the *Caliphate.* Importantly too, the Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio led *jihadist* war was followed by the institutionalization of the Emirate (which later on became the North's Native Authority), as the universally-accepted legitimate rulers of the expansive *Sokoto Caliphate.* The result is that given the two centuries of long unbroken experience of northern Nigeria with traditional self-rule, the

local population that had been accustomed to sharia law and traditional administration under the *Sokoto Caliphate* would inevitably consider the imposition of British colonial administration, (even though it was camouflaged as "Indirect Rule"), as foreign invasion of their long established socio-political and governance structure.

The colonial period therefore saw the seed of resistance against the 'invasive' British protectorate authority germinate and flourish in the context of **we vs. them** construct. In that sense it was also not lost on the expansive *Sokoto Caliphate* that with British colonial administration also came Christianity. The British protectorate, and by extension its successor, the Federal Government of Nigeria, were thus perceived as part of the Christian evangelizing crusade, or at least as its enablers, to the detriment of Islam. On the basis of all this, it is not difficult to see *Boko Haram* frame the Government of Nigeria and its devolved units as enemies of Islam that true Muslims would morally be justified and spiritually bound to resist by all means, including by violent means. By waging such a war, *Boko Haram* becomes perceived as fighting and standing for the advancement and consolidation of Islamic religious ethos, in itself, a 'sacred calling'.

4.3.4 Movement Against Blocked Opportunities

As already shown in chapter one of this Report, there are more than 100 different ethnic groups in the North East Nigeria which is also the epicentre of the *Boko Haram* insurgency. In their normal and natural search for respective ethnic identity and political space; and in order to jostle for contestable shared economic opportunities, these ethnic nationalities would engage stiff inter-ethnic competitive stances. In such an environment, opportunities for the less powerful minority ethnic communities, at the local level, would invariably be somewhat blocked or severely curtailed by the more powerful and populous ones. At the national level, northern Nigerian populations have had generally, limited access to Western Education, in part as already alluded to, due to their disdain for it from the very beginning, in preference for the traditional Islamic education system. This meant that less of the northern populations attained professional and technical skills and qualifications necessary for accessing jobs in the secular public and private sectors. The sum total of this is that opportunities have seemingly been blocked for them at both regional and national levels. This resonates with the Cloward and Ohlin's Opportunity Theory, (1960), which prepositions that those who engage violence for utilitarian purposes are for one reason or another, unable to obtain the same through legitimate peaceful means; usually due to what may present as discriminative systemic blockage of opportunities.

A toxic environment contaminated with widespread endemic senses of discriminative denial and oppression among its proliferate ethnic groups interfaces with grievance-filled mind-sets of the local populations to render them vulnerable to religious radicalization and violent extremist political propaganda. Feeling aggrieved at their inability to secure livelihoods, such population groups are likely to withdraw their support for conventional legitimate norms and instead, turn to organized criminal gang action as vehicular or instrumental means of achieving their dreams.

4.3.5 Movement Against Perceived Historical Marginalization

European expeditionary entry and subsequent spread into inland Nigeria was made from its coastal southern regions. Western Education was accordingly, introduced first in the Nigerian southern territories, where it was welcomed and embraced by the populations. Coming with Western Education as a package, was on the one hand, Christianity, and on the other, training in professions and technical skills needed by the nascent public and private sectors of a westernizing Nigeria. The early embracement of Western Education and attainment of secular professional and technical skills and qualifications by southern populations meant that they had a head-start, firstly

to embed themselves and subsequently to dominate key positions in various domains of the public and private sectors of the emergent nation-state of Nigeria. Ever since then, the southerners have indeed seemingly dominated and controlled Nigeria's public administration, and its professions, both in the public and private sectors. In contrast, Nigeria's northern populations, relatively not having attained as much secular professional and technical skills and qualifications, in as many numbers as the southerners had done, considered themselves disadvantaged. They subsequently developed the grievance mind-sets that have persisted to date.

4.3.6 Protest Against Governance Deficit and Perceived State Failure

State failure as already articulated elsewhere in this report represents the manifestations of 'the failed promise' of independence, not just in Nigeria but elsewhere in Africa. Other than the economic, political, socio-ethnic and religiously articulated reasons for the general sense of disaffection, *Boko Haram* has also managed to project itself as a protest movement against endemic corruption, misuse of public resources and abuse of office by successive post-independence regimes in Nigeria. The claimed poor governance and perceived inability of the government to deliver basic public goods and services to its citizens has been attributed to endemic corruption. These basic public goods and services include peace and security; basic education and health care; enabling environment for private investments; equitable socio-economic development; and the creation of employment opportunities for the youth, in tandem with population growth. It is arguable that these are plausible claims that helped embolden *Boko Haram* and its sympathizers to describe Nigeria in such terms as a 'failed state.'

The figure 4.1 below presents a graphic illustration of the framework model of grievance-based causes and motivations of the *Boko Haram* insurgency, as explained in terms of the foregoing analysis.

Fig. 4.1 | Schematic Graphic Presentation of Causes, Motivations and Justifications for the Boko Haram Insurgency

4.4 Support Systems and Identity Framework of Perpetrators and Enablers

From both the historical and contemporary perspectives, the primary causes and motivation of the *Boko Haram* insurgency is a complex web of competing socio-political and economic interests informed and juxtaposed by multiplicities of causal and motivation factors. The ethno-cultural and socio-economic as well as political grievance narratives that help explain the insurgency are particularly exacerbated by deep and longstanding historical rivalry between religious precepts and ideologies. A framework model that is capable of profiling identities of perpetrators and enablers of the insurgency is thus critically important, not only for broad-based appreciation of its operations and likely trajectory, but also for contextualizing its formidability to effect the violent destruction of human life and property; human abduction and trafficking – mostly of boy children used as foot soldiers, and girl children used as sex slaves; displacements of persons from their homes and livelihoods; breakdown of social and physical infrastructures; disruption of provision of basic social services, especially health and education; and radicalizing mind-sets of large populations through religiously articulated indoctrination and extremist political propaganda.

To sustain its insurgency, *Boko Haram* requires both human and material resources as well as technical and logistical support, which it sources both internally and externally. For its soft power, the insurgency employs religiously articulated radical narratives and extremist political propaganda to also make claim to spiritual formidability. The framework model presented herein is principally intended to help profile identities of perpetrators and enablers of the *Boko Haram* and illustrate its structural layers which put together constitute its support system of internal and external factors.

4.4.1 The Internal Support System and Enablers of Boko Haram

The internal support and enabling system for *Boko Haram* consists of at least five layers of direct and indirect perpetrators and general enablers of the insurgency. The first layer is that of core planners and the central command while the second comprises the various formations of field units of fighters and suicide bombers. The third layer envisages clandestine supporters and collaborators. The fourth layer envisages sections of the masses of the population and sympathizers of the insurgency; some informed by ethnic affiliations while others are prompted by a shared political ideology, religious identity as well as the doctrinal articulations. The mass populations of sympathizers would invariably offer support and facilitation to the insurgency in diverse covert ways such as financial and logistical support. The fifth layer of enablers envisages the multitudes of mostly unemployed youth, both boys and girls that are, mostly, excluded from mainstream livelihoods. They, in most cases, strongly feel aggrieved by their deplorable socio-economic statuses and therefore making them highly vulnerable to recruitment into the insurgency. Characteristically they would often resort to violence to express their grievances.

It is indisputable that the multitudes of unemployed youth hold the political class responsible for their plight and that of the majority of poor citizens. Youth unemployment in North Eastern Nigeria has long been an issue especially when it became conspicuously evident that a large number of graduates of tertiary institutions started being noticed in the streets of Maiduguri, and secondary school leavers could not proceed to higher institutions of learning. What presents as a case of blocked opportunities for the youth therefore generated a large number of idle, hungry, frustrated and desperate youth who remain vulnerable to recruitment by *Boko Haram*. In a nutshell, youth

unemployment and pervasive poverty have thus greatly engendered the *Boko Haram* insurgency by placing at its disposal large populations of unemployed youth that are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment into the insurgency.

Modular Anatomy of Boko Haram Support System and Identity Framework of Perpetrators and Enablers

Eternal Sources
of Foreign Fighters & Arms
Supply

Mass Populations
of Supporters
& Sympathizers

Willing Recruits
among Unemployed
Youth

Clandestine
Supporters in Public,
Religious & Private Sector
Institutions

Formations
of Devoted Fighters
& Suicide Bombers

Innercore
Planners
and
Central
Command

4.4.2 The External Enabling Environment and Support System for Boko Haram

There exits, historically, a strong interface between the predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria to Islam in the Maghreb and the wider Sahel, with the long-standing relationship dating back to hundreds of years before. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the early 2010s Arab Spring movement that affected several Maghreb and Middle-East countries caused a new awakening of Islamic fervour in northern Nigeria in a rather significant way. The epic events re-energized and redefined the historical relationships in the context of enhanced awareness of democratic rights of youth and populist demands for political accountability and equal access to shared prosperity. Moreover, the youth were emboldened by the concurrent emergence of other jihadist movements on the global scene, and what presented as their spiritual and physical formidability against Western dominance.

Northern Nigeria, apart from being predominantly Muslim, also borders several Islamic states to its north, north-west and north-east. Some elements within these neighbouring states share in the globalization agenda of Islam. The *Boko Haram* being a product of some of these externally inspired and religiously informed conspiracies therefore also presents as part of a globalizing Islam. The emergence and entrenchments of *Boko Haram* insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria is

therefore, to be viewed from the wider perspective of worldwide manifestations of fundamentalist Islam that is inspired by the global *jihadist* ambitions.

4.4.3 AvailabilityandEasyAccesstoForeignArmsandMunitionsasEnablers

The proliferation of arms and munitions trafficked across the expansive sparsely populated and largely inadequately governed spaces of the Sahel into the Lake Chad region gives *Boko Haram* easy access to sophisticated weaponry from outside the region. Being the gateway into Nigeria from North and Central Africa, and given the porosity of Nigeria's international borders with Chad, Cameroon and Niger, the Borno and Yobe States have for long served as entry points for the illegal arms and ammunitions trafficked along the north-south corridor. Additionally, arms and munitions are also trafficked along the wide east-coast to west-coast corridor, and across the sparsely populated and weakly governed spaces of the greater Sahel. The arms then enter the Lake Chad enclaves and finally find their way into North East Nigeria. By occupying the particularly vantage region of North Eastern Nigeria, which is the intersection point of the north-south and east-west arms trafficking routes, *Boko Haram* is doubly endowed and enabled as far as accessing arms and munitions is concerned. The figure 4.2 above illustrates the enabling support system for *Boko Haram* and the identities framework for perpetrators and enablers of the insurgency.

4.5 A Proposed Conceptual, Analytical and Response Framework

The framework model proposed herein is for the better understanding of the *Boko Haram* insurgency and developing an appropriate mitigation intervention strategy that would suppress its impacts in North East Nigeria and even beyond. The evolution of the framework is informed by a deeper understanding and appreciation of the root, as well as proximate, causal factors of the crisis; the violence motivation theories in the context of the insurgency; the support systems and identity frameworks of the insurgency perpetrators and enablers; and contextual development and governance challenges that bedevil the region. The framework is also informed by the need to move the region onto an equitable and sustainable development trajectory and consequently, the realisation of the promise of prosperity. The framework is founded on two critical realities; first, that the architecture and manifestations of the insurgency are multi-dimensional in terms of both causes and effects. The second reality is that there exists a *Humanitarian-Development – Peace Nexus,* defined as *the continuum of inter-connections and inter-relationships between humanitarian and development, as well as the security crises characterized by, on the one hand fairly nuanced conceptual, analytical and operational challenges; and on the other hand, opportunities for durable positive change and sustainable development* and that a clear understanding and unpacking of the 'nexus' is the basis of credible and effective mitigation strategies

> There exists a Humanitarian-Development – Peace Nexus, defined as the continuum of inter-connections and inter-relationships between humanitarian and development, as well as the security crises characterized by, on the one hand fairly nuanced conceptual, analytical and operational challenges; and on the other hand, opportunities for durable positive change and sustainable development and that a clear understanding and unpacking of the 'nexus' is the basis of credible and effective mitigation strategies against the adverse multi-faceted impacts of the insurgency.

against the adverse multi-faceted impacts of the insurgency. These two realities need to be isolated, defined, understood, contextualised and assessed as part of understanding the insurgency and developing a long-term mitigation intervention strategy. The isolation, redefinition and re-assessments of the key parameters need to be done from an analytical paradigm and prism of policy making and as well as from mitigation intervention strategy development view point. This is necessary, not only for the North-East region *per se,* as the epicentre of the insurgency, but also as a pre-requisite for broader mitigation intervention focussing on the entire Lake Chad geo-political and socio-economic system, which realistically and broadly speaking is the operating environment of *Boko Haram.*

4.5.1 Unpacking the Humanitarian-Development - Peace Nexus

The novel way to unpack and help [re]conceptualise the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (H-D-P) nexus is to render it in terms of what this report has conceptualised as the "**Three plus Five (3+5) Integrated Framework**. The Framework envisages, at the apex *Three* **Foundational Response Pillars,** which correspond to the three inter-related components of the nexus which are in turn guided and underpinned by *Five* **Guiding Principles.** In the context of any conflict, violence and hence a raging humanitarian and development crisis, the **three** critical '**Foundational Response Pillars'**, the continuum, inter-relationships and interactions of which forms the 'nexus', automatically tend to be the following:

1. **Humanitarian Assistance**;
2. **Development;** and
3. **Peace and Security**

These three always tend to top the list in practically all cases, mainly because of the immediate emergencies that arise as a result of the sudden disruptions and the threat posed to lives and livelihoods. Historically, the responses to emergencies and humanitarian crises have been rather linear and indeed sequential with distinct and separately pronounced humanitarian and development phases. Security and peace building would then be infused at various points along the response pathway depending on prevailing circumstances, including sometimes at the tail end of the pathway. Such a lineal response model entailed disparate approaches with different actors and response mechanisms along the pathway, often un-coordinated and certainly, not integrated. Thus, in the event of an emergency or crisis, the humanitarian actors would ordinarily move in first to offer the necessary humanitarian assistance and stabilise the situation long before development actors subsequently move in during what is presumably the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase. Such an approach would, evidently, not leverage the limited resources available and synergies across sectors and actors; and over time, build on their comparative advantages, resources and experiences.

The '**Three Plus Five' Integrated Framework** is thus, conceptually founded on a clear understanding of the parameters and key variables that define the 'Foundational Pillars' and necessary 'Guiding Principles; including the key policy and programmatic levers; actors and success indicators that are specifically applicable in the context of North-East Nigeria, but also applicable more generally.

4.5.2 Humanitarian Assistance Pillar

The parameters and indicators associated with humanitarian interventions are well documented and include the basic life-saving assistance that has to be immediately availed whenever large scale violence erupts. The basic life-saving assistance are often provided by the respective Local Governments, the State Government and a host of Humanitarian actors (inter-governmental and

non-governmental) as well as community groups. However, beyond the immediate needs of food and non-food items including medical supplies; water and sanitation; and protection, 'the nexus' approach calls for long-term perspectives that can handle the nuances and complexities that arise in such situations; notably the long-term needs and aspirations of the affected people especially, the more vulnerable populations such as the defenceless women and children; the physically challenged; the youth and more fundamentally, the hordes of displaced populations who live among host communities in the most unpredictable and unusual circumstances. Embedded within this pillar therefore, is the need to take full cognisance of the long-term aspirations of, and hope for a secure and more prosperous future by, the people who find themselves in such crisis situations. The crisis situation that they find themselves in does not in any way diminish or extinguish their own desires and hope for fulfilled lives and prosperous future. In short, a humanitarian situation such as has occurred in Nigeria's North East presents a fairly complex scenario that requires both short term and long-term measures in order to uncover and deal with nuances not so obvious in typical emergency situations. These long-term measures therefore, should be integrated into the response framework as early as possible and not only at a later stage.

4.5.3 Development Pillar

Development is, in turn always incremental and basically, builds on society's own aspirations and goals. It entails the progressive experience of the people in order to weed themselves out of the primordial lifestyles of poverty, want and deprivation. The innate desire of people to weed themselves out of poverty and deprivation provides a useful starting point for adopting long-term development view and instituting [long-term] development measures even during the 'humanitarian phase'. In general, development has to be felt in terms of indicators that include sustainable access to basic goods and services, principally health and education; descent and durable jobs; and economic opportunities that are created for the majority of the population. The Development Pillar therefore, includes such elements as restoration of livelihoods - agriculture, commerce; skills acquisition and entrepreneurship; and basic economic and social infrastructure, including especially those necessary for educational advancement and health services. It includes easy and sustainable access to basic services, particularly water, sanitation and hygiene all without which the former focus on purely emergency measures is doomed to fail. It also involves reconstruction and rehabilitation of the basic economic and social infrastructures Needless to say, while both Federal and State Governments have the primary responsibility for developing policies and creating the conducive environment for development to thrive in such crisis situations, development partners, other non-state actors, and especially the private sector, all have an important role to play as anchors of the Development Pillar.

4.5.4 Peace and Security Pillar

This constitutes the third Foundational Pillar of the "nexus" approach. As the adage goes, peace is not merely the absence of war; rather it conceptualises the feeling of being both physically and emotionally secure wherever one lives. Peace and security does however, presume the existence of capacity to defend one self, family and property from internal and external threats and ability to go about one's business unhindered. In the nexus context therefore, it implies the existence of both the Federal Government as well as State and local area capabilities to deal with real and perceived threats to security. The Nigerian government's capabilities in forestalling both the sources of intra- and inter-national threats to peace and security are extremely important. Beyond the national responsibility however, the broader international security apparatus is obviously implicated because within the nexus approach and as the North-East shows, Nigeria is part of the community of nations; bordered as already noted by other equally restive countries and where in particular, porous borders are a noted avenue for cross-border conflicts and violence as well as a

source of illicit arms. In short, the continuum around security becomes one in which, beyond the national response capacity, neighbouring countries and the wider international community have to be involved as well.

4.6 The 'Plus 5' Guiding Principles

Conceptually speaking, the foregoing approach based on an understanding of the three pillars and their inter-connectedness and non-linearity is doomed to fail if they are not, in turn underpinned-or have as their bedrock- the following five pre-requisites, or as it were, the supporting Five Guiding Principles each of which is unpacked here below:

1. Good Governance;
2. Partnerships and Capacity Building;
3. Funding and Sustainable Financing;
4. Environmental Sustainability; and
5. Deeper and Granular Analytics

4.6.1 Good Governance as the Irreducible Nexus Core

The experience of Nigeria's North East as described elsewhere in this report confirms without a shadow of doubt, that good governance is undoubtedly, the primary core around which any society can experience its birth and renewal, and ultimately, realise its full potential. As various studies have shown, good governance allows for unfettered public participation in the manner and style in which society is governed; it allows for accountability across the board for what people, and especially leaders, do and finally, it entails a society in which the people as a majority have voice and the confidence that they can peacefully choose and elect leaders of their choice. In the words of former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, "Good Governance is ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration." In echoing the sentiments around Good Governance, the UN enumerated the eight principles that are presumably definitive:[2]

i) **Participation;** i.e. People should be able to voice their own opinions through legitimate immediate organizations or representatives;

ii) **Rule of Law,** i.e. a Legal framework that should be enforced impartially, especially on human right laws;

iii) **Consensus Oriented,** i.e. the mediation of differing interests to meet the broad consensus on the best interests of a community;

iv) **Equity and Inclusiveness,** implying people should have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being;

v) **Effectiveness and Efficiency,** meaning that processes and institutions should be able to produce results that meet the needs of their community while making the best of their resources;

vi) **Accountability** implying that government institutions, private sectors, and civil society organizations should all be held accountable to the public and institutional stakeholders;

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2   For these eight principles, see for instance: https://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/g-attributes.html

vii) **Transparency,** i.e. information being made accessible to the public and should be understandable and monitored; and

viii) **Responsiveness,** implying that institutions and processes should serve all stakeholders.

4.6.2 Partnerships and Capacity Building

Unpacking and operationalising the 'nexus' requires various vertical and horizontal partnerships built around strong and accountable institutions; and healthy, skilled, motivated and committed human capital. It requires strong institutional capacities founded on functional systems, procedures and reliable infrastructure. While these may have been destroyed or disrupted as result of the insurgency and the resultant crisis, embedding them in the response model as part of the 'nexus' approach is desirable. As has been shown, in most emergency and humanitarian situations, the educational and health as well other public infrastructure suffer most while any skilled manpower would either have been killed or those who manage to do so, escape to safe territories or, at best, the most qualified persons migrate. The North East of Nigeria has, as a result of the decade-long conflict and violence, not been spared this familiar curse, leading to critical shortages affecting practically every shade of manpower needs. The manpower is often required not only to offer highly specialised services such as in health or education, but sustainability requires educated people who can be relied upon to put in place efficient and accountable public administration systems. Coupled with this is the imperative of restoring or upgrading, as the case might be, the total range of infrastructure requirements such as buildings, equipment, supplies and communication so that public goods and services can be delivered. Central to the success of the nexus in this context is the effective partnerships between the diverse range of stakeholders: Federal, State and Local authorities on the one hand, and with the international community and non-state actors on the other hand built around their mandates, comparative strengths and leveraging all available resources.

4.6.3 Ensuring Predictable Funding and Sustainable Financing

Traditionally, emergency and crisis response funding is mobilised at short notice, particularly by international NGOs, the UN and other aid organisations, often following appeals by governments under whose watch the humanitarian emergencies have erupted. The reality however, is that in the nexus context, concurrent mechanisms ought to be put in place to create conditions under which there can be more assured and predictable funding, preferably over the medium-term. Such funding must, of essence, be primarily sourced from Government which retains the ultimate accountability for rehabilitation and restoration of livelihoods. Sustainable funding of crisis is a win-win situation for Government, for it allows for restoration of livelihoods and economic activities which not only strengthen the bonds of accountability between Government and the population it governs but also leads to the generation of revenue needed for development. Concurrently, and especially over the medium-to long-term, appropriate development financing mechanisms, principally founded on government's own revenue as well as a multiplicity of financing mechanisms involving, principally, the private sector, should be developed. There is a strong business and moral case to be made for the deeper involvement of the Private Sector in the financing of crises response under the 'nexus' approach. The North East represents a potentially important source of inputs, including labour needed by, and market outlet for goods and services produced by the private sector. But sustainable financing cuts across the entire spectrum of the nexus as the private sector is often an important beneficiary of the humanitarian response as suppliers of critical goods and services, including food and non-food items. As may be appreciated, such sustainable financing can only be predicated upon the existence of all the other aforementioned principles; especially

the requisite institutional capacities; sound policies, respect for the rule of law, super-essence of peace, followed by a corresponding strategy that ensures the return to an accountable, transparent governance system that can create belief in the sort of public institutions entrusted with unfettered responsibilities to formulate laws, policies and legislate for budgetary provisions that deliver the totality of human development to the people who so badly need it. Needless to say, greater financial inclusion – vertical and horizontal-, through a multiplicity of institutional mechanisms such as banking and non-banking financial services; savings and credit societies; local cooperatives; and insurance is a critical ingredient of the sustainable financing principle and ultimately, a thriving local economy.

4.6.4 Environmental Sustainability

One of the findings to be gleaned from this report is that conflict and violence have serious compounded effect on the environment, both in the immediate areas habited by displaced and host populations and the wider geographic area affected by the crisis. As noted elsewhere in the report, life in IDP camps by the thousands of displaced families has severe compounding effect on dignity, health and productivity of the people. It was also noted that environmental degradation is a major cause of the conflict and hence, the raging humanitarian crisis. A region such as the North East of Nigeria that was in the earlier years the literal bread basket for the nation is no longer capable of feeding itself. Agricultural production has been particularly affected. Population pressure; land and habitat degradation; loss of grazing lands and climate change right across the region have created major stresses on the environment and led to conflicts over access to and use of resources, in effect exacerbating the conflict within the region and also, evidently, leading to spread of the conflict to other neighbouring geographic areas. With an encroaching Sahara Desert and the diminishing Lake Chad waters, conditions are being set up for unending resource-based conflicts and erosion of livelihoods. In light of all these, the 'nexus' will require robust strategic engagements that will ensure environmental conservation and sustainable utilisation of water, land and land-based resources. Undoubtedly, proper waste management; clear and appropriate tenure systems and property regimes, as well as land use systems that promote conservation of natural resources, restore productivity; restoration of the waters of the Lake Chad; and adapting to and mitigating climate change and its debilitating effects will be needed as part of the overall response strategy.

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4.6.5 Deeper and Granular Analytics

The pillar relating to 'Deeper and Granular Analytics' is extremely important in an interventional sense since it would ensure that '*no one is left behind*' and that '*the furthest behind are reached first*' with life-saving and development interventions. It would promote equity, inclusiveness and justice. Its core is the need to strive for comprehensive, reliable, accurate and up-to-date data that can support the overall process of planning and implementing humanitarian and development interventions over space and time. Far too often, in crisis

situations, numbers are in doubt because they are either underplayed or exaggerated leading to poor decision making. More often than not, the analysis is carried in a disjointed and sometimes repetitive manner failing to leverage on the experience and expertise of the full range of all the actors involved. Regular and comprehensive collection of data and information; fine-grained analysis of data and information to generate the necessary statistics, focusing on small geographic areas as well as different gender and socio-economic groups will ensure that the needy are clearly identified and interventional measures are well targeted to those most in need. It will also ensure that the impact of interventions is easily and readily quantifiable. In the North East, it has already been acknowledged in this report that the data capture of those embedded into communities has been elusive and therefore their levels of need has remained uncertain. More critical is also the fact that owing to historic and institutionalised discrimination against women, and the youth, the full impact of the conflict and violence on the gender dimension remains uncertain. Granularity in, and deepening of, analysis covering various dimensions of the crisis could help address this. Deeper and Granular analysis also calls for looking beyond the traditional sources of data and information (usually the surveys and administrative data) and hence, the leveraging of 'Big Data' and the 'Data Revolution' by sourcing data from non-traditional sources.

4.7 Proposed Models for Addressing Violence Motivation Factors and Unpacking the Nexus

4.7.1 The Insurgency Quantum Factor (IQF)

The modular framework model proposed herein lends itself for use as a tool for analysis and developing a range of interventions that can help address the *Boko Haram* insurgency and its impacts. It is also a useful tool that can help address the motivational factors, guide reconstruction and resilience building in the regions and communities already devastated by the insurgency and hence continuing to endure serious humanitarian and development challenges. There are three objectives to the model; analytical; interventional, as well as reconstruction and resilience building. This renders it versatile enough in scope, to take care of the key parameters including providing a conceptual framework for the realistic assessment of the insurgency's impacts.

The fundamental premise of the model is that *Boko Haram's* several acts of insurgency are perpetrated by different role players whose combined actions result in four core end-effects referred to hitherto; i.e., violent destruction of human life and property; abduction and trafficking of persons, mostly boy children used as foot soldiers and girl children used as sex slaves; displacement of persons from their homes and livelihoods; and radicalization of populations through religiously articulated ideological indoctrination and extremist political propaganda.

Envisaged intervention measures would include concerted steps to suppress the insurgency as well as coordinated measures for reconstruction, and resilience building to restore affected communities. Accomplishing these would have to focus on a multiple number of intervention areas, the key ones being; improved security and peace building; social infrastructures development; economic and livelihoods recovery; rehabilitation and reintegration of displaced persons and deserting fighters; and establishment of institutional infrastructures for inclusive governance systems.

The key indicator variables are thus, on the one hand; the quantum factor of the *Boko Haram* insurgency, made up of levels of its recruitment, perpetration and radicalization; all these having negative impacts; and on the other hand, positively impacting variables, namely; levels and intensity of counter-insurgency measures; rehabilitation and reintegration efforts; rebuilding community resilience, depending on degrees of degradation of original resilience levels; and the amount of reconstruction of physical and social-economic infrastructures in affected regions.

The model matrix presented below captures selected possible mitigation intervention measures against a backdrop of negative and positive dimensions of the insurgency. In a modular sense, positive impacts of reconstructive resilience building; restoration of affected communities' infrastructures and livelihoods; de-radicalization, reintegration, resettlement and psycho-social support for abductees, displaced persons and fighters deserting the insurgency, etc, would net off negative direct impacts of the insurgency and corresponding ripple effects, to arrive at what is referred to as the *Insurgency Quantum Factor* (IQF) as shown in the illustrated schematic figure 4.3 set out below.

Fig. 4.3 SchematicIllustration*ofMultivariableIndicatorsandRestorativeInterventionMeasures in Respect to the Boko Haram Insurgency

Dimension: 1
Radicalization
Population
Displacements
Lost Livelihoods

Marginalization   Ideology   Justice   Peer Engagement   Criminal Activity

Communities may possess certain characteristics that make the likelihood of radicalization higher.

Dimension: 2
Resilience Building &
Restorative Reconstruction

Community Attachment/Detachment   Community   Reporting Avenues   Security Tiers
Narrative

Resilientcommunitiesmaydeterorpreventterrorism,pushitbackorblock/minimiseitseffectsandimpacts on the community

Dimension: 3
Psycho-Rehabilitation,
Returnees Reintegration,

Livelihoods Restoration   Stakeholder   Psychosocial
Socio-economic Support   (Government)   Support
Action/In-action

The grater the amount of restorative services available the lesser the level of impact of insurgency on community.

TheBasicassumption;thereisarelationshipbetweeninsurgencyanditsdirectandindirectimpactonthe community

Dimension 4   *Cost of Insurgency*

Radicalised mindsets,   *Broken-down*   *Loss of Direct/indirect Investments,*
Population   *Social &Physical*   *Governance systems,*
Displacements,   *Infrastructures,*   *Social Harmony*
Increased School-Dropouts,   *Lost Businesses &*
Low School Enrolments   *Livelihoods*

INDICATORS   INTERVENTIONS

—**Adapted from, Pawson, R. & Tilley, N. (1997), Realistic Evaluation, London, SAGE

Based on the multivariable indicators and intervention measures possible, as captured in the schematic diagram above, we would surmise the overall Insurgency Quantum Factor (IQF) as follows; *IQF = (amount of terrorism + recruitment + radicalization) - (resilience + rehabilitation + socio-economic support)*

4.7.2 Integrated Framework for Unpacking and Operationalising the Nexus

To complete the analytical framework for conceptualising and operationalising the nexus approach, we propose an integrated crisis response framework which takes into account the **Insurgency Quantum Factor** approach and the holistic and non-linear as well as the inter-connectedness of, and inter-relationships between the **Three Foundational Pillars** and the **Five Guiding Principles** as aforementioned.

Fig. 4.4 An Integrated Framework for Unpacking and Operationalising the Nexus in N.E Nigeria

Countering Violent Etremism

Identification of drivers
Counter-terrorism narratives
- Conflict prevention
- Social harmony
- Peer engagement
- Community policing and reporting channels

Enhancing Livelihoods and Opportunities

Reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure
- Broad-based training and skills acquisition
- Improving access to factors of production – land, capital and entrepreneurals
- Facilitate local and international commerce
- Strengthening and legal and regulatory frameworks

Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Resilience Building

Improve security and restore social order
Conflict resolution and peace building
- Psychosocial support and psycho-rehabilitation
- Reconstruction of physical and institutional infrastructures
- Re-integration of displaced persons
- Rebuilding community resilience

4.8 Conclusions

The tenable conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis undertaken in this chapter is simply that intervention and response models that comprehensively assures *Rehabilitation, Re-Integration and Sustainable Development* are those in which key actors work in concert, leveraging as it were, on the experiences of each other while taking into account the complex causal factors some of which are extremely long-standing in nature and the non-linear and multidimensional nature of the crisis. Good governance has been found to be an irreducible minimum without which even petty grievances; including the lack of employment and other opportunities for young people can spiral out of proportion into irreconcilable levels. The three core pillars of peace and security; a

humanitarian operations and response, followed closely by the developmental pillar are still core, but it is also clearly evident that the former (peace and security) is a major off-shoot from good governance.

The analysis relating to root causes; particularly the internal and external enabling factors, also referred as the main drivers of the *Boko Haram* violence, and as fundamentally; the role of comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date data in facilitating long-range planning are extremely essential to the quest for appropriately targeted responses to the crisis. In a word, this report is categorical that only a holistic and a properly integrated response framework whose applicability relies on mutually interdependent and reinforcing mechanisms will produce the desired outcomes. Such interdependence and integration as illustrated in figure 4.4, implies and includes the focused and deliberate attention to countering violent extremism, particularly through the identification of its key motivating factors or drivers. It also entails the developmental response, unpacked to its bare minimum as rehabilitation, reconstruction and resilience-building that has to be championed by all involved actors, including the Federal Government of Nigeria. Measures that enhance livelihoods and opportunities in the long term, such as broad-based training and skills acquisition, access to the main factors of production such as land and capital; the facilitation of local and international commerce as well as deliberate measures to strengthen polices and regulatory frameworks are vital.

Conclusively, there is no doubt from the perspective of this report, that only such an integrated approach will yield an inclusive and purposive growth, ensure shared prosperity and provide some decent comfort as Nigeria races with the rest of the global community towards achieving sustainable development in the context of the global Agenda 2030.

Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (I-HDI)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of achievements in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. It is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (I-HDI) on the other hand adjusts the HDI for inequality in distribution of each dimension across the population. It is computed as a geometric mean of the inequality adjusted dimensions of human development. The IHDI accounts for inequalities in HDI dimensions by discounting each dimension's average value according to its level of inequality. The I-HDI thus equals the HDI when there is no inequality within the population but reduces as inequality rises. The "loss" in potential human development due to inequality is given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, expressed as a percentage.

Graphically;

Calculating the human development indices—graphical presentation

Calaculating the HDI

The specific equation used to estimate the HDI is given as:

$HDI = (IHealth . IEducation . IIncome)^{1/3}$

Where I_{health} is the Health Index; $I_{education}$ is the Education Index and I_{income} is the Income Index

Each Dimension Index is calculated using the formula:

Dimension index $=$ $\dfrac{\text{actual value} - \text{minimum value}}{\text{Maximum value} - \text{minimum value}}$

While the various indicators are calculated using the following formulae:

Mean Years of Schooling Index (MYSI) = $\dfrac{MYS}{13.2}$

Expected Years of Schooling Index (EYSI) = $\dfrac{EYS}{20.6}$

Educational Index (EI) = $\sqrt{(MYSI) * (EYSI)}$

Life Expectancy at Birth $e_x = \dfrac{T_x}{l_x}$

- where
    - (MYS) is the number of years a 25 years old and above have spent in school
    - EYS is the total number of years a 5year old child will spend in his/her education in his/her whole life time.
    - Tx signifies the total stationary or life table population at age x
    - lx denotes the survivors of a cohort of live born babies to the exact age x

Calculating the I-HDI

The I-HDI draws on the Artkinson family of inequality measures and sets the aversion parameter α equal to 1.

The inequality measure $A_x = 1-\mu/\beta$ where μ is the geometric mean and β if the arithmetic mean

The Inequality-adjusted HDI (*I-HDI**) = $[(1-$ *AHealth*$). 1- $*AEducation*$). (1- $*AIncome*$)]^{1/3}. $*HDI*.

While the loss in human development index due to inequality is given by

Loss % = $1 - [(1-$*AHealth*$). (1-$*AEducation*$). (1-$*AIncome*$)]^{1/3.}$

Data Sources

- Projected Population from National Population Commission
- GNI per Capita in dollars from GNI Group – National Bureau of Statistics
- Human Development Indices Survey 2017- National Bureau of Statistics

Gender Inequality Index (GII)

Gender Inequality Index (GII) is the percentage of potential human development lost due to gender inequality. It reflects gender-based disadvantage or inequality in achievement in specific dimensions and the extent to which such inequality affects human development. It varies between 0 (when women and men fare equally) and 1 (when one gender fares as poorly as possible) in all measured dimensions. In this report, GII is measured on the basis of the three dimensions of reproductive health, empowerment and labour market represented by the indicators shown below.

GII	Dimensions		
	Reproductive health	Empowerment	Labour market
Indicators	1. Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) 2. Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR)	1. Parliamentary seats by each sex 2. Educational attainment of ages 25 years and above with at least secondary	1. Labour force Participation Rate (LFPR) by sex
DimensionIndex	Reproductive Health Index	Empowerment Index	Labour Market Index
		GII	

The GII is calculated in five iterative steps:

Step 1: Treatment of zero and extreme values

Since the geometric mean cannot have a zero value, a minimum value of 0.1 was set for adolescent fertility rate and proportion of parliamentary seats held by women; lower and upper limits for MMR were set at 10 and 1000, respectively on the basis of the assumption that states where maternal mortality ratios exceed 1,000 do not differ in their inability to create conditions and support for maternal health while states with 1-10 deaths per 100,000 births are performing at essentially the same level.

Step 2: Aggregating indicators across dimensions within each gender using geometric mean

For women and girls, the aggregation formula is

$$G_F = \sqrt[3]{\left(\frac{10}{MMR} \times \frac{1}{AFR}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \times (PR_F \times SE_F)^{\frac{1}{2}} \times LFPR_F}$$

For men and boys, the formula is

$$G_M = \sqrt[3]{1 \times (PR_M \times SE_M)^{\frac{1}{2}} \times LFPR_M}$$

Step 3: Aggregating indicators across gender groups, using harmonic mean

Female and male indices are aggregated using the harmonic mean to create equally distributed gender index, that is, capture the inequality between women and men and adjust for association between dimensions.

$$HARM(G_F, G_M) = \left[\frac{(G_F)^{-1} + (G_M)^{-1}}{2}\right]^{-1}$$

Step 4: Calculating the geometric mean of the arithmetic means for each indicator

In this step, the female and male indices are aggregated using equal weights (thus treating the genders equally) and then aggregating the indices across dimensions.

$$G_{\bar{F},\bar{M}} = \sqrt[3]{\overline{Health} \times \overline{Empowerment} \times \overline{LFPR}}$$

Where

$$\overline{Health} = \frac{\left(\sqrt{\frac{10}{MMR} \times \frac{1}{AFR}} + 1\right)}{2}$$

$$Empowerment = \frac{\left(\sqrt{PR_F \times SE_F} - \sqrt{PR_M \times SE_M}\right)}{2}$$

$$\overline{LFPR} = \frac{LFPR_F + LFPR_M}{2}$$

Step 5: Calculating the Gender Inequality Index

In the final step, the geometric mean is then used to divide the harmonic mean and the resulting quotient is subtracted from 1 to give the Gender Inequality Index at the particular level.

$$GII = 1 - \frac{HARM(G_F, G_M)}{G_{\bar{F},\bar{M}}}$$

Data Sources

The data required for computing all the indicators in the three dimensions are sourced from:

- Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) – Human Development Indices Survey 2017 - NBS

- Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR) – MICS5 -2016

- Share of Parliamentary Seats by Sex (PR) – Human Development Indices Survey -2017

- Educational Attainment of ages 25 and above with at least secondary education by sex (SE) – Human Development Indices Survey 2017

- Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) by sex – Human Development Indices Survey 2017.

Technical Note 3:

Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)

The Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is a measure of acute poverty developed by Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) in collaboration with UNDP's Human Development Report Office. It was first published in the 2010 UNDP Global Human Development Report. The purpose of MPI is to present the status of poverty level at the national level and for purposes of this report, at the sub-national (regional and state) levels. The MPI presents the number of people who are multi-dimensionally poor and the deprivations such people face at the household level. It is a measure of the share of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of deprivation.

Poverty is not merely the impoverished state in which a person actually lives, but a lack of real opportunities due to social and other constrains and circumstances that inhibit living a valuable and dignified life. The concept of poverty goes beyond absence of or low income to inadequate amenities but include poor health and nutrition; low education and skills; inadequate livelihoods; poor housing conditions; lack of jobs; and social exclusion, as well as lack of participation in household decisions.

For this report we have adopted a nationally contextualized MPI (2016) with dimension of health measured by a long and healthy life, education measured by knowledge, living standards measured by decent standard of living; and labour force measured by unemployment.

The Nigeria MPI Dimensions

The Nigerian MPI is composed of four dimensions made up of eleven indicators

Dimension	Indicator	Description
Health	Nutrition(measured by adult Body Mass Index (BMI)	A household is deprived if there is any adult with malnourished (BMI<18.5kg/m2) nutritional information
	Child mortality (measured by death in the family)	A household is said to be deprived if any child less than 15 years in the household have died
Education	Years of Schooling	Household is said to be deprived if any household member 15 years and above has not completed five years of schooling
	Child School attendance	Household is deprived if any child in the household between ages 5 and 15 years is not attending school.
Standard of living	Lighting	Household is deprived if it has no electricity.
	Access to water	Household is deprived if it does not have access to safe drinking water (according to MDG guidelines)
	Sanitation	Household is deprived if the sanitation facility is not improved (according to MDG guidelines), or it is improved but shared with other households
	Floor type	Household is deprived if it has a dirt, sand or dung floor.
	Coking fuel	Household is deprived if it cooks with dung, wood or charcoal etc. Use of "dirty" fuel like firewood/charcoal/dung to cook is an indication of poverty
	Asset ownership	Household is deprived if it has less than two assets (radio, TV, bike/motorcycle, mobile phone, refrigerator and bicycle) and does not own a car.
Labour force	Unemployment	household is said to be deprived if any household member (15–64 years) is looking for work and available for work but did not secure a job.

Indicator Weighting

Each dimension and each indicator of each dimension were assigned equal weights as shown below:

Dimensions	Indicators	Deprived if	Weight	TotalWeight
Education	Yearsofschooling	Anyhouseholdmember15yearsandabovehasnot completed five years of schooling	1/9	1/4
	Child school attendance	Anychildinthehouseholdbetweenages5and15years is not attending school	1/8	
Health	Child mortality	Anychildlessthan15yearsinthehouseholdhave????	1/8	1/4
	Nurtrition	Anyadultforwhomthereisnutritionalinformationis malnourished (BM|<18.5kg/m²)	1/8	
Living Standard	Lighting	The household has no electricity	1/24	1/4
	Sanitation	The houshold's sanitation facility is not improved (accordingtoMDGguidelines),oritisimprovedbut shared with other households	1/24	
	Use of Water	Thehouseholddoesnothaveaccesstosafedrinking water (according to MDG guidelines)	1/24	
	Floor	The houshold has a dirt, sand or dung floor	1/24	
	Cooking fuel	Thehouseholdcookswithdung,woodorcharcoaletc	1/24	
	Asset	Thehouseholdhaslessthantwoassetsanddoesnot own a car	1/24	
Unemployment	Unemployment	Anyhouseholdmember15yearsaboveislookngfor work and available for work	1/4	1/4

Definition of MPI Concepts

Incidence of Poverty (H) — This is the share of the population who are identified as poor or simply, the head count ratio. It is the proportion of those who are deprived in more than one fourth of the weighted indicators.

Intensity of Poverty (A) — This is the average share of deprivations people experience at the same time. In other words, it is the average poverty gap as a proportion of the poverty line.

Poverty Cut Off (k) — The Poverty Cut off (k) used for calculating the NMPI is k = 26%. Households whose sum of weighted deprivation experience are equal to or greater than 26%, are classified as multidimensionally poor

Adjustedheadcountratio(M_o)— The adjusted head count ratio which is referred to as MPI value is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty by the intensity of poverty (H*A).It shows the proportion of deprivations that the country's poor people experience out of the total possible deprivations that would be experienced if every person in the society were poor and deprived in every indicator. The MPI value ranges from zero to one.

Identifying the multidimensionally poor

There are two types of poverty cut-off points used when identifying the multidimensionally poor:

Deprivation cut-off–	Each individual in the household is assigned a deprivation score according to the deprivations in the component indicators. The deprivation score of each individual in the household is calculated by assigning a value 1 if the individual is deprived and the value 0 if the individual is not deprived in that indicator.
Poverty cut-off –	the deprivation values of each household is aggregated and if the deprivation score is equal to or greater than the poverty cut-off denoted as K, the household is identified as multi-dimensionally poor. A household is identified as poor if the deprivation score is higher than or equal to 26% that is the deprivation must be more than one-fourth of the weighted considered indicators to be multidimensionally poor. For households whose deprivation scores are below the poverty cut-off, even if it is non-zero, their score is replaced by the value of 0 and any existing deprivations are not considered in the censored head counts. This step is referred to as *censoring* the deprivations of the non-poor And to differentiate the original deprivation score from the censored one, we use the notation $c_i(k)$ for the *censored* deprivation score.

Computing the MPI

The MPI is a product of two components:

(1) The **incidence** of poverty within a given population which identifies the percentage of people who are poor or the Headcount ratio (**H**)

$H = \dfrac{q}{n}$ Where q is the number of people who are multi-dimensionally poor and n is the total population.

(2) The **intensity** of poverty which is the average deprivation score or percentage of dimensions in which poor people are deprived denoted as (**A**)

$$A = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i(k)}{q}$$

Where, $c_i(k)$ is the censored deprivation score of individual i and q is the number of people who are multi-dimensionally poor.

The MPI denoted as M_0 is the percentage of deprivations poor people experience, as a share of the possible deprivations that would be experienced if all people were deprived in all dimensions.

$M_0 = H*A$

Decomposing the MPI by geography and population groups

MPI can be decomposed by population into sub-groups. For instance, the MPI can be decomposed by geographic areas such as rural – urban; States/sub-national geographic areas or any other classification so long as the respective populations add up to the total population. When decomposing MPI by rural -urban, for instance, the formula used is:

$$MPI_{country} = \frac{n_u}{n} MPI_u + \frac{n_R}{n} MPI_R$$

Where U denotes 'urban' and R denotes 'rural', and n_u / n is the population of urban areas divided by the total population, and similarly for n_R / n is the population of rural areas divided by total population; where $n_u + n_R = n$.

The contribution of each area/group to overall poverty is computed using the following formula:

Contribution of indicator i to MPI = $\dfrac{\dfrac{n_u}{n} MPI_u}{MPI_{country}} * 100$

Whenever the contribution to poverty of a geographic area or some other group widely exceeds its population share, this suggests that some geographic areas or groups may bear a disproportionate share of poverty.

Decomposition of the MPI by dimensions and indicators

To decompose by indicators, censored headcount ratio for each indicator was computed. This was obtained by adding up the number of poor people who are deprived in that indicator and dividing by the total population. Once computed using the eleven indicators, it can be verified that the weighted sum of the censored headcount ratios equal the MPI.

$$MPI_{country} = w_1 CH_1 + w_2 CH_2 + ... + w_{11} CH_{11}$$

Where w_1 is the weight of indicator 1 and CH_1 is the censored headcount ratio of indicator 1, and so on for the other ten indicators, with $\sum_{i=1}^{d} w_i = 1$.

The percentage contribution of each indicator to overall poverty is computed as follows:

Contribution of indicator i to MPI = $\dfrac{w_i CH_i}{MPI_{country}} * 100$

Whenever the contribution to poverty of a certain indicator widely exceeds its weight, this suggests that there is a relative high deprivation in this indicator in the country. The poor are more deprived in this indicator than in others. As can be seen in the figure below, Nigerians are more deprived in the employment and education domains, with 24.89% and 21.98% contributions to poverty, respectively.

Source of Data

For the computation of MPI, only one source of data - the 2017 Human Development Indices Survey-, was used.

The 2017 Human Development Indices Survey generated data on:

- Demographic Characteristics
- General Mortality (i.e. deaths in the last 12 months)
- Maternal Mortality
- Employment History
- Access to water
- Sanitation
- Housing Characteristics
- Information major industries including Cement Companies and Oil Refineries
- Supplementary data from selected MDAs
- Educational attainment among households
- Anthropometry

The survey covered households in both urban and rural areas in all the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja using the Enumeration Areas (EAs), which established through the National Integrated Survey of Households (NISH). A total sample 120 Enumeration Areas (EAs) were selected in each of the 36 states, and the FCT. In each EA, a sample of 15 households (HHs) was selected for the study, making a total of 1,800 households per State and a national sample size of 66,600 households.

Annex 1: Human Development Index and its Components

Human Development Index 2016			Life Expentacy at Birth			Life Exp. Index	Education			Gross National Income (GNI)				Human Dev. Index 2013		Change in HDI Value	Change in HDI Rank
Rank	State	Value	Male	Female	Total		Mean Year of Sch.	Exp. years of sch.	Education Index (EI)	GNI per Capita	GNI Index	GNI/ Capita ($) Rank	GNI Rank - HDI Rank	Rank	Value	2013-2016	2013-2016
1	Lagos	0.6515	48	51	49	0.4589	12.3039	20.2653	1.0069	7,972.40	0.5986	2	↑1	1	0.6716	↓0.0201	0
2	FCT	0.6289	50	55	52	0.5063	10.3757	15.7526	0.8152	8,174.17	0.6025	1	↓1	7	0.5112	↑0.1177	↑5
3	Bayelsa	0.5909	47	53	50	0.4747	11.7345	17.9684	0.9259	3,441.38	0.4693	3	0	2	0.6121	↓0.0212	↑1
4	Akwa-Ibom	0.5642	49	51	51	0.4905	11.2759	17.8731	0.9053	2,258.60	0.4045	7	↑3	4	0.5698	↓0.0056	0
5	Ekiti	0.5608	48	53	53	0.5222	11.3473	17.3358	0.8944	1,897.60	0.3777	9	↑4	16	0.4333	↑0.1275	↑11
6	Delta	0.5564	48	50	49	0.4589	11.2446	17.9446	0.9058	2,408.07	0.4144	4	↓2	3	0.6090	↓0.0526	↓3
7	Cross River	0.5510	51	56	54	0.5380	10.7340	16.8429	0.8574	1,720.18	0.3626	11	↑4	13	0.4726	↑0.0784	↑6
8	Ogun	0.5493	50	53	53	0.5222	9.8485	15.1824	0.7797	2,297.46	0.4072	5	↑3	5	0.5393	↑0.0100	-3
9	Rivers	0.5422	46	49	47	0.4272	11.3738	18.3619	0.9215	2,264.25	0.4049	6	↓3	23	0.3881	↑0.1541	↑14
10	Abia	0.5406	49	53	52	0.5063	11.0208	17.3137	0.8808	1,629.44	0.3543	12	↑2	10	0.4923	↑0.0483	0
11	Enugu	0.5405	49	53	52	0.5063	11.1715	17.5783	0.8936	1,573.48	0.3489	13	↑2	15	0.4366	↑0.1039	↑4
12	Edo	0.5299	46	48	50	0.4747	10.6874	16.5716	0.8486	1,798.07	0.3695	10	↓2	8	0.5087	↑0.0212	↓4
13	Imo	0.5182	50	52	53	0.5222	11.3759	18.1352	0.9159	1,079.72	0.2910	20	↑7	6	0.5200	↓0.0018	↓7
14	Osun	0.5123	52	55	52	0.5063	10.7262	16.7655	0.8551	1,225.47	0.3105	17	↑3	9	0.4938	↑0.0185	↓5
15	Kwara	0.5112	48	53	52	0.5063	9.1789	13.0040	0.6967	1,909.62	0.3787	8	↓7	17	0.4316	↑0.0796	↑2
16	Nasarawa	0.5063	45	51	50	0.4747	10.2699	14.7970	0.7861	1,561.87	0.3478	14	↓2	22	0.3983	↑0.1080	↑6
17	Ondo	0.5002	50	52	52	0.5063	10.9027	17.1099	0.8709	1,031.01	0.2839	22	↑5	11	0.4768	↑0.0234	↓6
18	Anambra	0.4709	47	50	48	0.4430	11.4198	18.2672	0.9210	859.73	0.2559	27	↑9	18	0.4281	↑0.0428	0
19	Plateau	0.4629	43	47	46	0.4114	9.7777	14.7554	0.7659	1,261.18	0.3149	16	↓3	21	0.3995	↑0.0634	↑2
20	Benue	0.4624	46	50	47	0.4272	10.1141	15.8003	0.8061	1,052.84	0.2871	21	↑1	20	0.4038	↑0.0586	0
21	Taraba	0.4613	48	51	47	0.4272	9.8251	14.2723	0.7551	1,177.98	0.3044	18	↓3	27	0.3315	↑0.1298	↑6
22	Kogi	0.4509	45	48	46	0.4114	10.7632	16.7890	0.8572	883.13	0.2600	26	↑4	19	0.4057	↑0.0452	↓3
23	Oyo	0.4401	51	55	51	0.4905	8.6150	13.3182	0.6830	851.34	0.2544	28	↑5	12	0.4765	↓0.0364	↓11
24	Ebonyi	0.4343	47	52	48	0.4430	9.9539	14.3740	0.7628	787.82	0.2425	30	↑6	26	0.3433	↑0.0910	↑2
25	Adamawa	0.4286	42	44	43	0.3639	8.6187	12.4528	0.6606	1,368.85	0.3275	15	↓10	25	0.3653	↑.0633	0
26	Kaduna	0.4043	43	48	45	0.3956	8.1201	12.4671	0.6416	885.36	0.2604	25	↓1	14	0.4432	↓0.0389	↓12
27	Gombe	0.4010	45	49	48	0.4430	6.4268	9.2733	0.4923	1,113.35	0.2957	19	↓8	31	0.2368	↑0.1642	↑4
28	Niger	0.3991	47	53	50	0.4747	6.4296	11.9763	0.5596	771.80	0.2393	31	↑3	28	0.3256	↑0.0735	0
29	Kebbi	0.3815	48	50	52	0.5063	4.5400	8.4711	0.3955	988.44	0.2774	23	↓6	33	0.2184	↑0.1631	↑4
30	Jigawa	0.3596	44	48	47	0.4272	4.7561	9.6106	0.4311	840.87	0.2525	29	↓1	35	0.1968	↑0.1628	↑5
31	Kano	0.3592	46	49	47	0.4272	5.6805	10.6397	0.4957	675.83	0.2189	32	↑1	24	0.3812	↓0.0220	↓7
32	Zamfara	0.3392	47	50	50	0.4747	4.8421	9.1213	0.4238	574.81	0.1939	34	↑2	30	0.2623	↑0.0769	↓2
33	Borno	0.3276	42	48	43	0.3639	7.6342	11.1041	0.5871	474.96	0.1646	35	↑2	34	0.2135	↑0.1141	↑1
34	Yobe	0.3249	42	46	44	0.3797	3.3827	7.8910	0.3295	967.26	0.2740	24	↓10	37	0.1247	↑0.2002	↑3
35	Bauchi	0.3238	45	49	45	0.3956	4.7611	8.8727	0.4145	626.28	0.2071	33	↓2	29	0.2636	↑0.0602	↓6
36	Katsina	0.3031	47	51	49	0.4589	4.9587	9.5791	0.4395	399.98	0.1381	37	↑1	32	0.2364	↑0.0667	↓4
37	Sokoto	0.2910	48	51	50	0.4747	4.0190	6.8091	0.3336	447.88	0.1555	36	↓1	36	0.1942	↑0.0968	↓1
	National	0.5114	47	51	49	0.4589	9.9569	15.6743	0.7966	1,756.56	0.3659				0.5060	0.0054	

Annex 2: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)

Human Development Index 2016			Life Expentancy (LE)		Education		Income		Inequality Adjusted Human Dev. Index (IHDI) 2016			IHDI	Change in IHDI	
Rank	States	Value	Inequality in Life Exp.	Ineq. Adj. LE Index	Inequality in Edu.	Ineq. Adj. Edu. Index	Ineq. in Income	Ineq. Adj. Income Index	Value	Rank	Loss in HDI	2013	2013 - 2016	2016 HDI Rank - IHDI Rank
1	Lagos	0.6515	0.7760	0.3561	0.5362	0.5399	0.9925	0.5941	0.4852	1		0.5245	↑0.0393	0
2	FCT	0.6289	0.7847	0.3973	0.4617	0.3764	0.9926	0.5980	0.4472	2	0.2889	0.4577	↑0.0105	0
3	Bayelsa	0.5909	0.7790	0.3698	0.5059	0.4685	0.9868	0.4632	0.4313	3	0.2701	0.5577	↑0.1264	0
4	Akwa-Ibom	0.5642	0.7819	0.3835	0.5001	0.4527	0.9826	0.3975	0.4102	4	0.2730	0.4816	↑0.0714	0
5	Ekiti	0.5608	0.7874	0.4111	0.4943	0.4421	0.9804	0.3703	0.4068	5	0.2747	0.3725	↓0.0343	0
6	Delta	0.5564	0.7760	0.3561	0.5007	0.4535	0.9833	0.4075	0.4037	6	0.2744	0.5132	↑0.1095	0
7	Cross River	0.5510	0.7900	0.4250	0.4812	0.4126	0.9791	0.3551	0.3963	7	0.2807	0.3990	↑0.0027	0
8	Ogun	0.5493	0.7874	0.4111	0.4463	0.3480	0.9828	0.4002	0.3854	11	0.2984	0.4587	↑0.0733	↓3
9	Rivers	0.5422	0.7696	0.3288	0.5069	0.4672	0.9826	0.3979	0.3939	8	0.2735	0.3158	↓0.0781	↑1
10	Abia	0.5406	0.7847	0.3973	0.4905	0.4320	0.9783	0.3466	0.3904	10	0.2779	0.4238	↑0.0334	0
11	Enugu	0.5405	0.7847	0.3973	0.4954	0.4427	0.9778	0.3412	0.3915	9	0.2756	0.3622	↓0.0293	↑2
12	Edo	0.5299	0.7790	0.3698	0.4770	0.4048	0.9797	0.3620	0.3784	12	0.2860	0.4309	↑0.0525	0
13	Imo	0.5182	0.7874	0.4111	0.5043	0.4619	0.9715	0.2827	0.3772	13	0.2720	0.4346	↑0.0574	0
14	Osun	0.5123	0.7847	0.3973	0.4800	0.4105	0.9738	0.3023	0.3667	14	0.2842	0.4189	↑0.0522	0
15	Kwara	0.5112	0.7847	0.3973	0.3988	0.2778	0.9805	0.3713	0.3448	17	0.3255	0.3835	↑0.0387	↓2
16	Nasarawa	0.5063	0.7790	0.3698	0.4460	0.3506	0.9777	0.3400	0.3533	16	0.3022	0.3573	↑0.0040	0
17	Ondo	0.5002	0.7847	0.3973	0.4866	0.4238	0.9706	0.2755	0.3593	15	0.2817	0.4033	↑0.0440	↑2
18	Anambra	0.4709	0.7729	0.3424	0.5063	0.4663	0.9668	0.2474	0.3406	18	0.2768	0.3362	↓0.0044	0
19	Plateau	0.4629	0.7663	0.3153	0.4386	0.3359	0.9743	0.3068	0.3191	21	0.3107	0.3141	↓0.0050	↓2
20	Benue	0.4624	0.7696	0.3288	0.4592	0.3701	0.9710	0.2788	0.3237	19	0.2999	0.3265	↑0.0028	↑1
21	Taraba	0.4613	0.7696	0.3288	0.4314	0.3257	0.9731	0.2962	0.3166	22	0.3138	0.2900	↓0.0266	↓1
22	Kogi	0.4509	0.7663	0.3153	0.4808	0.4121	0.9674	0.2516	0.3197	20	0.2910	0.3326	↑0.0129	↑2
23	Oyo	0.4401	0.7819	0.3835	0.3954	0.2701	0.9666	0.2459	0.2942	24	0.3315	0.3864	↑0.0922	↓1
24	Ebonyi	0.4343	0.7729	0.3424	0.4349	0.3317	0.9648	0.2339	0.2984	23	0.3130	0.3000	↑0.0016	↑1
25	Adamawa	0.4286	0.7556	0.2750	0.3781	0.2498	0.9757	0.3195	0.2800	25	0.3468	0.3090	↑0.0290	0
26	Kaduna	0.4043	0.7629	0.3018	0.3692	0.2369	0.9675	0.2519	0.2621	26	0.3517	0.3473	↑0.0852	0
27	Gombe	0.4010	0.7729	0.3424	0.2433	0.1198	0.9721	0.2874	0.2276	28	0.4325	0.2095	↓0.0181	↓1
28	Niger	0.3991	0.7790	0.3698	0.3240	0.1813	0.9643	0.2308	0.2492	27	0.3756	0.2701	↑0.0209	↑1
29	Kebbi	0.3815	0.7847	0.3973	0.1482	0.0586	0.9698	0.2690	0.1843	32	0.5169	0.1876	↑0.0033	↓3
30	Jigawa	0.3596	0.7696	0.3288	0.2049	0.0883	0.9663	0.2440	0.1921	31	0.4659	0.1613	↓0.0308	↓1
31	Kano	0.3592	0.7696	0.3288	0.2677	0.1327	0.9610	0.2103	0.2094	29	0.4171	0.3018	↑0.0924	↑2
32	Zamfara	0.3392	0.7790	0.3698	0.1876	0.0795	0.9566	0.1855	0.1760	33	0.4810	0.2217	↑0.0457	↓1
33	Borno	0.3276	0.7556	0.2750	0.3276	0.1923	0.9507	0.1565	0.2023	30	0.3826	0.1744	↓0.0279	↑3
34	Yobe	0.3249	0.7593	0.2883	0.0708	0.0233	0.9693	0.2656	0.1213	36	0.6266	0.1063	↓0.0150	↓2
35	Bauchi	0.3238	0.7629	0.3018	0.1743	0.0722	0.9590	0.1987	0.1630	34	0.4967	0.2176	↑0.0546	↑1
36	Katsina	0.3031	0.7760	0.3561	0.2098	0.0922	0.9447	0.1305	0.1624	35	0.4642	0.1817	↑0.0193	↑1
37	Sokoto	0.2910	0.7790	0.3698	0.0344	0.0115	0.9488	0.1476	0.0855	37	0.7060	0.1561	↑0.0706	0
	National	0.5114	0.7760	0.3561	0.4553	0.3627	0.9794	0.3583	0.3590		0.2980			

Annex 3:   Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and its Components

| | | | | | | | Censored Headcount Ratio by State at K=26% | | | | | | | | | |
| Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) | | | Health | | Education | | Standard of Living | | | | | | Unemployment | Component of MPI (Adjusted Headcount M0) by state | | | |
Rank	State	Mpi (M0)	Nutrition	Child Mortality	Year of Schooling	School Attendance	Lighte-ning	Use of Water	Sanitary	Type of Floor	Cooking Fuel	Assets	Unemployed	Incidence of Poverty (H)	Intensity of Deprivation (A)	HDI Rank	HDI Rank - Mpi Rank
1	OSUN	0.062038	1.7	0.1	12.5	1	10.6	6.7	13.6	5.4	16.9	9.6	6.7	17.5	35.5	14	↑13
2	ANAMBRA	0.091454	0.7	0	8.4	2	7.3	9.7	12	1.9	24.3	7.8	20.5	25.4	36.1	18	↑16
3	LAGOS	0.1023	2.6	0.1	6	2.4	2.5	16.5	21.4	0.7	17.8	7.6	24.3	27.8	36.8	1	↓2
4	OGUN	0.115106	4.7	0.3	19.8	5.1	15.7	13.6	26.8	9.9	26.5	16.3	13	29.7	38.7	8	↑4
5	EKITI	0.115275	4.6	0.2	15.6	1.3	14.7	9.1	25.6	6.7	29.1	15.2	18.6	30.6	37.7	5	0
6	DELTA	0.117001	1.2	0.4	18.4	2.1	12	12.3	23.1	2	27.7	12.8	20.8	30.6	38.2	6	0
7	ONDO	0.120314	3.2	0.2	18.5	2.3	21.3	13.5	29	5.2	29.9	17.2	16.6	32.4	37.1	17	↑10
8	EDO	0.144214	3.1	0.6	19.6	4.7	9.8	12.5	20.5	6.2	35.6	19	26.4	37.6	38.3	12	↑4
9	OYO	0.152048	9.8	0	28.3	10.8	24.9	14.4	36.5	13.5	37.3	28.1	10.5	38.3	39.7	23	↑14
10	ENUGU	0.152061	2.9	0	17.5	1.7	15.7	22.6	26.7	5.2	37.5	16	29.1	39.7	38.2	11	↑1
11	CROSS RIVER	0.159753	5.5	0.5	18.8	3.8	17.7	20.2	32.1	9.2	40.8	22.6	25.9	41.4	38.6	7	↓4
12	KWARA	0.161384	2.8	1.2	32.5	10.8	21.6	2	35.3	11.2	40.2	20.5	16	40.8	39.5	15	↑3
13	ABIA	0.164706	0	0.4	14.3	3	13.6	9.5	16.3	6.4	43.1	16	39.6	44.4	37.1	10	↓3
14	IMO	0.164752	1.7	0.8	11.8	1.2	14.4	3.8	20.7	3.5	45.1	13.1	41.4	45.4	36.3	13	↓1
15	BENUE	0.165513	6.2	2	29.9	8.4	32.3	18.7	27.9	21.5	43.7	27.2	14.4	44	37.6	20	↑5
16	FCT	0.174368	3.4	1.1	29.3	8.8	24.8	25.1	36.3	11	39.7	17.9	22.7	43.5	40.1	2	↓14
17	KOGI	0.188412	1.9	1	27.9	4.8	24.6	22.9	35.8	6.7	46.1	20.8	31.4	47.3	39.9	22	↑5
18	ADAMAWA	0.202785	5.5	6.2	44.2	28.9	39.7	25.2	15.2	29	50	24.6	8.1	50	40.5	25	↑7
19	KADUNA	0.207843	4	4.3	41.1	19.8	29.3	13.8	26.6	13.5	48	19.9	23.4	50.4	41.3	26	↑7
20	RIVERS	0.222939	1.4	0.1	9.5	3.3	11.4	11.3	44.4	4.3	56.6	23.5	56.8	58.9	37.9	9	↓11
21	BAYELSA	0.227215	4.8	1.5	18.4	4	30.1	27.1	47.5	7.4	51.8	29.7	44.3	53.7	42.3	3	↓18
22	NASARAWA	0.237637	2.1	3.2	38.4	11.6	39.8	29.1	36.5	13.8	54.6	20.7	35	56.4	42.1	16	↓6
23	AKWA IBOM	0.244742	9.2	0.9	18.4	5.8	24.6	17.1	27.2	14.4	59.4	28.3	52.2	59.7	41	4	↓19
24	EBONYI	0.248383	10.2	0.3	43.6	5.7	53.6	28.5	55.3	28.7	58.9	37.7	25.7	58.9	42.2	24	0
25	NIGER	0.266353	6.3	7.1	59.4	42.3	38.3	28.8	43.5	14.3	63.8	30.1	12.5	64.4	41.4	28	↑3
26	TARABA	0.281892	2.7	5.1	63.1	22.2	73.2	60.5	45.6	45.3	73.7	41.9	9.5	73.8	38.2	21	↓5
27	PLATEAU	0.29196	8.9	4	48.8	16.5	50.2	35.4	45.9	25	66.3	36	34.6	66.7	43.8	19	↓8
28	KASTINA	0.312977	8.6	5.3	74.7	59.1	60.5	22	29.4	45.7	75.1	55.3	3.3	76.2	41.1	36	↑8
29	BORNO	0.314512	4.9	4.7	59.8	39	39.5	20.6	23.9	18.8	70.4	43.7	35.5	71.6	43.9	33	↑4
30	BAUCHI	0.314751	16.8	3	69.5	56.6	57.9	33.8	12.5	43.8	71.5	42.8	9.2	71.9	43.7	35	↑5
31	KANO	0.331384	15.1	4.5	64.3	49.9	48.1	33	16.8	47.9	70.4	38	23.3	71.1	46.6	31	0
32	ZAMFARA	0.337014	2.9	7.8	77.8	55.5	73.3	58.8	20.8	52.7	78.4	45.4	7.9	79.3	42.5	32	0
33	GOMBE	0.353391	18.1	4.6	72.9	60.3	57.5	52.3	17.5	55.7	77.2	55.3	10.8	77.6	45.6	27	↓6
34	KEBBI	0.354203	7.4	6	80.7	71	51.4	44.2	31.3	32.9	81.8	43.3	11.6	82.3	43	29	↓5
35	YOBE	0.38488	10.4	7	77.9	60.7	62.2	32.2	39.7	65.3	78.4	52.6	20.9	79.2	48.6	34	↓1
36	JIGAWA	0.399312	17.6	8	81.8	66.6	71.4	7.2	21.2	72.3	85.9	59.8	19.8	86.1	46.4	30	↓6
37	SOKOTO	0.452799	14.8	10.5	88.4	71.4	68.6	71	32.2	68.3	89.6	60.1	23.6	89.9	50.4	37	0
	NATIONAL		6.6	2.8	39.6	23.8	33.2	23.3	27.4	22.7	52	28.8	22.4	53.7	41.9		

Annex 4: Gender Inequality Index and its Components

HDI	Gender Inequality Index (GII) 2016			Reproductive Health		Seats in Parliament Held (% of Total)		Population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older)		Labour Force Participation Rate (%)		Gender Inequality Index (GII) 2013		Change in GII (2013-2016)	
Rank	State	Rank	Value	Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)	Adolescent fertility ratio (births per 1000 women ages 15-19)	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Value	Rank	Value	Rank
1	LAGOS	1	0.422	110.4	21	7.5	92.5	73.5	85.9	81.9	98	0.491	12	↑0.069	↑11
2	FCT-ABUJA	8	0.522	83.6	39	2.5	97.5	45.4	65.6	77.8	89.9	0.710	29	↓0.188	↑21
3	BAYELSA	34	0.87	471.1	78	0.0	100	56.2	80.7	94.5	90.9	0.574	20	↓0.296	↓14
4	AKWA-IBOM	6	0.507	150.9	67	7.7	92.3	52.1	62.1	97.7	92.4	0.586	22	↑0.079	↑16
5	EKITI	18	0.643	876.8	60	4.8	95.2	54.3	65.4	81.5	99.9	0.435	9	↓0.208	↓9
6	DELTA	7	0.522	394.1	57	17.2	82.8	57.1	68.1	76.4	80.5	0.494	13	↓0.028	↑6
7	CROSS-RIVER	13	0.586	642.3	68	12	88	53.9	65.7	74.4	84.1	0.562	18	↓0.024	↑5
8	OGUN	29	0.829	258.8	50	0.0	100	39.1	51	90.2	97.4	0.527	16	↓0.302	↓13
9	RIVERS	11	0.563	483.4	18	2.5	97.5	74.7	83.9	92.3	98.8	0.503	15	↓0.06	↑4
10	ABIA	10	0.555	375.9	37	5.5	94.5	51.6	62.3	86.4	95.8	0.437	1	↓0.118	↓9
11	ENUGU	3	0.479	519	23	17.9	82.1	45.9	53.2	82.2	88.4	0.395	5	↓0.084	↑2
12	EDO	12	0.568	641.4	42	9.8	90.2	42.5	57	76.5	82.4	0.489	11	↓0.079	↓1
13	IMO	15	0.603	642.9	36	3.7	96.3	56.1	64.9	88.1	97.7	0.357	3	↓0.246	↓12
14	OSUN	31	0.849	344.1	57	0.0	100	46.1	61.1	79.6	89.3	0.494	14	↓0.355	↓17
15	KWARA	14	0.598	904.4	70	15.4	84.6	31.5	45.7	79.3	80.8	0.429	8	↓0.169	↓6
16	NASARAWA	20	0.701	817	101	2.5	97.5	33.7	57.8	72.6	79.3	0.769	31	↑0.068	↑11
17	ONDO	2	0.458	115.9	47	11.1	88.9	43.5	59.6	76.6	81.3	0.349	2	↓0.109	0
18	ANAMBRA	4	0.481	279	40	13.3	86.7	58.2	58.7	83.3	86.9	0.409	6	↓0.072	↑2
19	PLATEAU	16	0.615	278.5	94	4.2	95.8	39	58.2	73.8	80.9	0.738	30	↑0.123	↑14
20	BENUE	17	0.640	809.6	79	6.5	93.5	40	59.5	66.6	69.8	0.566	19	↓0.074	↑2
21	TARABA	33	0.86	623.2	81	0.0	100	33.8	53.5	91.9	97.9	0.552	17	↓0.308	↓16
22	KOGI	36	0.905	1267.8	36	0.0	100	43.5	65.9	73	81.6	0.486	10	↓0.419	↓26
23	OYO	9	0.531	184	54	5.9	94.1	34.2	45.2	85.1	88.1	0.418	7	↓0.113	↓2
24	EBONYI	5	0.504	218	53	13	87	31.5	42.1	78.7	90.8	0.389	4	↓0.115	↓1
25	ADAMAWA	21	0.749	1841.9	113	8	92	34.3	54.9	72.2	50.5	0.647	27	↓0.102	↑6
26	KADUNA	32	0.86	452.6	134	0.0	100	34.2	50.9	69.3	64.3	0.581	21	↓0.279	↓11
27	GOMBE	30	0.834	371.3	181	0.0	100	21.1	36.6	65.5	37.3	0.646	26	↓0.188	↓4
28	NIGER	28	0.825	387	138	0.0	100	16.4	38.1	71.4	48.5	0.597	23	↓0.228	↓5
29	KEBBI	23	0.778	506.1	157	0.0	100	4.6	20.4	83.4	51.9	0.704	28	↓0.074	↑5
30	JIGAWA	22	0.774	298.8	186	0.0	100	5.4	18.8	57.3	42.3	0.850	37	↑0.076	↑15
31	KANO	27	0.817	364.3	169	0.0	100	13.2	33.7	77.1	46.8	0.816	34	↓0.001	↑7
32	ZAMFARA	26	0.780	259.8	208	0.0	100	7.3	20.2	80.1	48.6	0.811	33	↑0.031	↑7
33	BORNO	37	0.908	2374.8	128	0.0	100	25.6	44.5	70.3	65.4	0.632	25	↓0.276	↓12
34	YOBE	35	0.881	1678.9	159	0.0	100	10.5	19.8	61.8	49.4	0.630	24	↓0.251	↓11
35	BAUCHI	19	0.698	593.8	186	2.8	97.2	9.5	22.6	79	41.4	0.785	32	↑0.087	↑13
36	KATSINA	24	0.779	214.2	218	0.0	100	7.7	23.1	57.9	31	0.823	35	↑0.044	↑11
37	SOKOTO	25	0.779	737.4	174	0.0	100	3.6	15.5	85.5	57.4	0.832	36	↑0.053	↑11
	National		0.635	567.5	120	6.6	93.4	39.2	53	78.2	75	0.579			

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